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“There can be no more important issue, and no more binding obligation, than the prevention 
of genocide… and yet, genocide has happened again, in our time. And states even refused to 
call it by its name, to avoid fulfilling their obligations”.  
                          Kofi Annan, General Secretary of the UN, 1997 
 
The focus of this research project is on the American practice towards genocide. It provides a 
comparative case study of Bosnia and Darfur in order to shed light on how to explain the 
American attitudes and response towards genocide. With regards to Bosnia, I will narrow my 
study to the massacre of Srebrenica in 1995. In both Bosnia in 1995 and Darfur in 2004, 
innocent civilians were slaughtered, but the United States adapted different approaches in 
order to address the two conflicts. While Darfur was the first time that an on-going crisis was 
defined as genocide, Srebrenica was not defined genocide before ten years after it had 
occurred. Due to the European failure to stop the crisis in Bosnia, the United States intervened 
in 1995. Throughout the whole Bosnian War (1992-95), the American Congress discussed 
whether or not to lift the arms embargo. While there was consensus that the United States 
should react because there was a conflict, disagreements concerned what action that should be 
taken. The scenario was different with regards to Darfur. In 2004, the American Congress 
addressed the term genocide more frequently. There tended to be more consensuses that the 
crimes committed by the Government of Sudan (GOS) towards innocent civilians in Darfur 
were genocide, and action should on background of this be taken. There was therefore in 2004 
more focus on the connection between crime and action. To define a conflict as genocide lead 
to certain responsibilities and obligations to act.  At the same time, states tend to not follow 
such responsibilities and obligations. Why do states often refuse its obligations? 
Why did the United States address Bosnia and Darfur differently? How can the United 
States, seventy years after the Holocaust still act vague in its addressing of genocide? The 
lesson of the Holocaust was “never again”. Never again could or should the international 
community allow the crimes that Jews had suffered during the Holocaust from happening 
again. Varieties of cases have since then proved that there is not necessarily a connection 
between theory and practice. Innocent people have in the aftermath of the Second World War 
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been killed in Cambodia, Iraq, Rwanda, Bosnia and Darfur1, and now most recently in Libya. 
I will look at the debates that took place in the American Congress at the time of the crisis in 
Bosnia and Darfur in order to see what can explain the American attitudes and response 
towards genocide. For this research project, I therefore ask: 
 What can explain the American attitudes to genocide? And how have these attitudes 
influenced response? 
Keohane, Verba and King, (1994:15) argue that in order for a research project to be relevant it 
should meet the two criteria of posing a question that is important in the real world, and 
contribute to the already existing literature. My research project fulfils the two criteria. The 
fact that genocide still takes place proves that my question is important in the real world. 
Seventy years after the Holocaust, leaders are still abusing its innocent people. The next 
section will show that my research question contributes to the already existing literature. 
1.1 Literature   
Much has been written in the field of genocide, and on the American attitudes and practice 
towards genocide. First of all, the definition of genocide is debated. Among scholars there are 
disagreements on whether the strict legal definition of genocide, based on Article 2 of the 
Genocide Convention serves as the most appropriate definition. I will come back to this 
discussion in the next section. In addition to the definition of genocide, more historical work 
has been provided, where scholars present case studies of genocide. In Genocide, A 
Comprehensive Introduction (2006), Adam Jones presents case studies of genocide of 
indigenous people from the time of Colonialism to Rwanda in 1994. Another explored field is 
the causes of genocide. In No Lessons Learned from the Holocaust, Assessing Risks of 
Genocide and Political Mass Murder since 1955 (2003), Barbara Harff developed a structural 
model consisting of six factors that were associated with the likelihood of genocide. Factors 
such as prior genocide in the same polity, autocracy, and ethnic minority rule, political 
upheaval during war or revolution, exclusionary ideology, or closure of borders to 
international trade increase the likelihood for genocide to occur.  
Scholars who concern about the causes of genocide are often presenting it in terms of 
early warning, and whether genocide can be predicted. Gregory Stanton, President of 
                                                
1 A classification of these cases as genocide is based on A Problem From Hell (2002) by Samantha Power. 
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Genocide Watch, states that genocide develops through the eight stages of classification, 
symbolization, dehumanization, organization, polarization, preparation, extermination and 
denial. Stanton has developed this framework so policy-makers can recognize early warning 
signs, and plan specific counter- measures to prevent genocides. Stanton (1996:2) argues that, 
“the first stages precede later stages. Each stage reinforces the others, so a strategy to prevent 
genocide should attack each stage, each process.” The successful identification of a potential 
genocide or politicide does not necessarily lead to prevention in terms of intervention. Krain 
(2005:32) argues that policymakers need information regarding the effectiveness of 
intervention and other policy options, and “future research needs to be directed toward this 
important goal if policymakers are to be convinced that pre-emption is possible and likely to 
be effective”. Krain (2005:30) further claims that, “the most effective way for the 
international community to intervene military in genocide or politicide is to directly challenge 
the perpetrator or to aid the target”. He also empathizes that attempts by external actors to 
intervene as impartial parties seem to be ineffective.  
Matthew C. Waxman (2009:21), on the other side, argues that external actors should 
play a significant role in humanitarian intervention, by claiming that the UN Security Council 
should improve its responsiveness. He (2009:21) claims that in order to combat the threat of 
mass atrocities, the United States should work with allies to improve this responsiveness, and 
additionally, “prepare and signal willingness, if the UN Security Council fails to act in future 
mass atrocity crises, to take necessary action to address them”. The argumentation of 
Waxman is based on a report of the Council on Foreign Relations. Besides providing specific 
recommendations upon the United States on to how to improve the responsiveness of the UN 
Security Council, the report (2009:4) aims “is to integrate the study of strategy and law or 
norms by emphasizing how political will and capabilities are not independent of international 
law but are shaped by it, and how the normative terrain of intervention can affect operations 
on the ground”. Waxman (2009:4) states that often the policy community and the 
international law community speak past each other on the issues of politics studies. 
Waxman’s argumentation, based on the report by the Council on Foreign Relations, reflects 
the aim of my research paper. I aim to study the American attitudes and response to genocide 
by addressing both structural and ideational explanations. 
Another explored field in the study of genocide is how states response to genocide. 
Samantha Power has in A Problem From Hell (2002), addressed how the United States has 
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reacted towards genocidal cases from the aftermath of the Second World War to the current 
cases of the late 1990s. Power (2002:503) aims to explain why the United States “has 
consistently refused to take risks in order to suppress genocide”. In order to answer such 
statement, she studied the factors of knowledge, influence, will and accountability. Power 
argues that political will was the most significant factor for why the United States failed to 
intervene in genocidal cases. As a concluding remark, Power (2002:512) predicts that the 
United States should stop genocide for the two reasons of moral and enlightened self-
interests. She ends her book with a sentence of hope that, “after a century of doing so little to 
prevent, suppress, and punish genocide, Americans must join and thereby legitimate the ranks 
of the unreasonable” (2002:516). I will follow up Power’s work in order to see what can 
explain the American attitude and practice towards genocide. Are there structural reasons that 
still explain American attitudes and practice towards genocide, or can it be explained through 
more morally oriented reasons?  
Before I present the theoretical framework, the methods and get into answering how to 
explain the American attitudes and practice towards Bosnia and Darfur, it is important to 
clarify the most important term for this study; the definition of genocide.  
1.2 The Definition of Genocide 
During the Second World War, the Polish lawyer Raphael Lemkin created the term 
“genocide”. Terrified by the crimes committed against the Armenians in the 1915, and the 
Jews during Second World War, Lemkin looked for a term to name the crime. Lemkin argued 
that mass killing or massacre simply did not qualify to explain the horrible crimes that 
Armenians and Jews had suffered. In 1943, he coined the word genocide, which was put 
together of the two words “genos” and “cide”. While “genos” means race or tribe, “cide” 
means killing. Lemkin first used the word in Axis Rule in Occupied Europe (1944), and it was 
consolidated with the Genocide Convention. Since then, the term genocide has been used 
towards various cases in the contemporary world, but there are often discussions related to the 
use of the word. 
 Ida Waal (2008) argues that the choice of definition depends on where it should be 
applied. Waal claims it depends on whether the definition should be applied to law, social 
science, or most problematic, to politic. She further claims that there are challenges related to 
both having a too narrow, and a too wide definition of genocide. While a too narrow 
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definition can lead to cases that should be classified as genocide go unpunished, a too wide 
definition would lead to inflation, and the term would then loose its importance. Both the 
scenarios are dangerous, and should be avoided. There tends to be most consensuses about the 
legal definition of genocide. The legal definition of genocide is based on the Convention on 
the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide of 1948, hereafter referred to as the 
Genocide Convention, and the statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC). In according 
to Article 2 of the Genocide Convention, genocide is any of the following acts committed 
with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as 
such; 
 
a. Killing members of the group;  
b. Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group;  
c. Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical 
destruction in whole or in part; 
d. Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group;  
e. Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group. 
 
While the Genocide Convention is focused on the definitional and prevention part of 
genocide, ICC is more focused on the aspect of punishment. The purpose of the ICC, which 
was created by the Rome Statute of 1998, is to end impunity for the perpetrators of atrocities 
that deeply shock the conscience of humankind. The four goals of ICC are justice and 
punishment, deterrence, record-keeping, and progressive development of international law 
(Noyes, 2006). ICC addresses the “international” crimes of genocide, crimes against 
humanity, and war crimes. These crimes all concern the use of violence according to 
international crimes. However, the content of each type of crimes vary substantially, and I 
will limit my study to the crime of genocide.  
 The legal definition is clear, but it is rather strict and narrow, and there have developed 
alternative definitions of genocide. Totten and Bartrop (2009:34) argue that scholars have 
developed their own definitions of genocide, and offered them as an alternative to the one 
used in the Genocide Convention. The alternative definitions include certain groups that the 
Genocide Convention has excluded, and it additionally include interpretations of the words 
“intent”, “in whole or in parts”, and “as such”. Israel W.Charny is in favor of a broader 
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definition that includes all groups2. The legal definition of genocide excludes political groups, 
which is often debated. Helen Fein (2009:44) argues that most definers have normative or 
prescriptive agendas in the sense that they are “activated by what we feel genocide should 
encompass- often not wishing to exclude groups.” She further claims that debates concerning 
genocide are about the identity of the target group, the scope of acts, the identity of the 
perpetrators, a distinction among types of genocide or whether or how to distinct intent 3. 
Roger Smith (2005) argues that genocide can be classified in various ways according to the 
nature of the victims, motives of the perpetrators, and the outcome. Smith states that genocide 
can be classified as retributive, institutional, utilitarian, monopolistic and ideological4. While 
there are alternative definitions to genocide, I will for this thesis rely on the legal and political 
definition of genocide. 
 While the legal definition is clear and precise, the political definition is wider, and much 
more unpredictable and flexible. While the legal definition is based on the Genocide 
Convention, and the statute of ICC, the political definition is more uncertain, and can be 
characterized as the definition in actual practice. It is the political response taken by states. 
The political definition is expectations about responsibility that is connected to a use, or 
refusal, of the term genocide. The political definition of genocide is much more diffusing than 
the legal since there is no universal adapted political definition.  
1.3 Research question 
In order to answer my research question of how to explain the American response toward 
genocide, I will use a model to explore factors that influenced the American attitudes, and 
further how these attitudes influenced the American practice. As theoretical framework, I will 
rely on what Craig Parsons (2007), in How to Map Arguments in Political Science refers to as 
structural and ideational explanations. I will operationalize these two explanations in order to 
                                                
2 For more; Charny Israel W (2005), The Definition of Genocide, in Totten, Samuel and Bartrop, Paul R, The genocide 
Studies Reader (2005), pp 36-40 
3 For more; Fein, Helen (2009), Defining Genocide as a Sociological Concept, chapter 2.3 in Totten, Samuel and 
Bartrop, Paul R, (2009), The Genocide Studies Reader, Routledge, pp 44-57 
 
4 For more: Roger W. Smith (2005), “Human Destructiveness and Politics: The Twentieth Century as an Age of 




better fit my study. In addition, some more factors, which might have served as intervening 
variables will be studied. It will in other words be a study that shed lights on the American 
attitudes and response towards genocide. It addresses a variety of explanatory factors that 
might have influenced attitudes in the American Congress, which again have shaped the 
American practice. I provide a comparative case study of Bosnia and Darfur where documents 
from the 104th (1995), and 108th (2004) Congress is analyzed. Bosnia and Darfur will in other 
words be compared in an operationalized version of Craig Pardon’s structural and ideational 
explanations.   
1.4 Disposition 
Chapter 2 presents the theoretical framework. I will briefly present Craig Parsons four ways 
of mapping arguments in political science before I argue for why the two arguments of 
structural and ideational explanations have been chosen for my study. I will further present an 
operationalized version of the structural and ideational explanations in order to better fit my 
study. Additionally, some other factors that might have acted as intervening variables in the 
American practice towards genocide are presented. In chapter 3, the research design, methods 
and sources are presented. Chapter 4 is the empirical part where a comparison of the two 
cases of Bosnia and Darfur is provided. The empirical material will be compared in order to 
determine how to explain the American practice towards genocide. Are there structural, 
ideational or other factors that can best explain the American attitudes and practice towards 
genocide? While Chapter 5 is the conclusion, the last section provides a bibliography divided 
into two parts. The first part is a bibliography of sources that have directly been used in this 




2 Theory  
2.1 How to explain politics  
In How to Map arguments (2007), Craig Parsons provides a typology of explanations of 
political action. Instead of focusing on theoretical or empirical challenges, Parsons’ main 
concern is to explain what causes what, and how we can explain action. Parsons distinguish 
between four explanations; structural, institutional, ideational and psychological. He 
(2007:40) stresses that people arrive at certain actions “due to some combination of causal 
forces from their structural-material surroundings, their man-made organizational context, 
their socially constructed ideational elements, or their psychologically hard-wired mental 
dispositions and motivations.” For this thesis, I will focus on the ideational and structural 
explanations in order to shed lights on the American attitudes and actions towards genocide. 
While Parsons (2007:13) state that ideational (and psychological) claims are logics of 
interpretation, structural (and institutional) claims are logics of position. By looking at 
ideational and structural explanations, I get to explore whether the American attitudes and 
practice towards genocide is influenced by interpretation or position. Is its behaviour shaped 
by interpretation of certain ideas, or is it the structure of the system that determines how the 
United States acts towards genocide? While ideational factors explain attitudes, action is 
explained through structural factors. A reliance on ideational and structural explanations 
makes it possible to study the link between attitudes and action, which this research project 
aims to do. I will start by addressing the ideational explanation.  
2.2 Ideational explanation  
The core logic of an ideational explanation is that it explains actions as a result of people 
interpreting their world through certain ideational elements (Parsons, 2007:96). Ideational 
elements, which are man-made, include practices, symbols, norms, grammar, models, beliefs, 
ideas, and/or identities. While the rational theories of Marxism, liberalism and realism, which 
will be addressed in the section on structural explanation, concerns about the structure, 
Constructivism stresses the importance of reality as socially constructed (Barnett, 2001:259). 
The origin of constructivism can be traced back to the 1980s when Constructivism developed 
as a result of the sociological critics of neo-realism and neo-liberalism. Constructivism rose as 
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a consequence of the lack of explanatory factors for the new international structure that 
emerged after the end of the Cold War (Barnett, 2001:256-57). Christian Reus-Smit (2004:21-
22) claims that Constructivism advances three propositions: 
1. Structures shape the behavior of states and actors.  
2. In order to understand the behavior of states, and other actors you have to understand 
how their social identities shape their interests and actions 
3. A structure exists because of the practice of social agents. 
 Although there are rival camps within the theory of Constructivism, there is a shared 
common concern that ideas define the international structure, which again constructs the 
identities, interests, and foreign policy practices of states. Reality can better be understood by 
studying it in terms of idealism and holism, rather than by relying on factors of materialism 
and individualism (Wendt, 1999:32). While the rational theories share an assumption of state 
interests as fixed, Constructivism challenges such view by claiming that even fundamental 
notions like the state, sovereignty and national interests are socially constructed. The social 
meaning is not fixed, but rather contingent (Abbott, 1999:367).  In Anarchy is What States 
Make of It (1999), Alexander Wendt argues that even anarchy is only socially constructed. 
Wendt further argues that the tendency in international relations to view power and 
institutions as two opposing explanations of foreign policy is misleading since ”anarchy and 
distribution of power only have meaning in....the understanding and expectations that 
constitute identities and interests” (Wendt, 1992: 401). Identities and interests are constructed, 
as a dependent variable (Wendt, 1999:318). States are part of an international structure that is 
always in contingent change, and these structural changes influence states behaviour. 
International actors operate within a social context of shared subjective understandings and 
norms, which constitute their identities and roles, and they define appropriate forms of 
conduct (Abbott, 1999:367). Norms serves as socially constructed ideas, and I will therefore 
look at this in the next section.   
2.2.1 Norms matter 
The once controversial statement that “norms matter” is today accepted by all except the most 
conservative neorealist (Checkel, 1997:473). Jeffrey Checkel (1997:488) argues that in order 
to understand the reality of how norms affect state behavior, the two schools of rational 
choice and Constructivism should be combined since “both rational choice and 
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Constructivism provide valuable insights into the domestic effects of global norms”. This 
research project does so by taking both structural and ideational factors into account.  
Norms are a standard of appropriate behaviour for actors with a given identity 
(Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998:891). Finnemore and Sikkink (198:892) further claims that 
because norms embody a quality of ‘‘oughtness’’ and shared moral assessment, norms prompt 
justifications for action and leave an extensive trail of communication among actors that we 
can study. The problem for constructivists thus becomes the same problem facing realists- to 
explain change. In an ideational international structure, idea- and norm shifts are the main 
vehicles for system transformation. Norm shifts are to the ideational theorist what changes in 
the balance of power are to realists (Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998:894)  
Even though there is consensus that norms matter, states adapt different approaches in 
how they commit and comply with norms. In Mobilizing for Human Rights (2009:111), Beth 
Simmons argues that in a process of ratifying human right treaties, governments “calculate the 
costs versus the benefits in the context of their values, region, national institutions, and time 
horizons”. She (2009:67) further claims that the main domestic reason for committing to a 
treaty is the expectation that it will be possible to comply at a reasonable cost. Most 
governments ratify treaties because they support them, and therefore also have intentions to 
comply. Simmons (2009:65) claims that the nearer a treaty is to a government’s ideal point, 
the more likely that governments is to commit. The explanation is straightforward because the 
closer a treaty is to a government’s ideal point, the smaller the required policy adjustments are 
likely to be. Simmons presents three categories of how government tends to commit to human 
rights treaties. First, there are the sincere ratifiers, which value the content of the treaty and 
anticipate compliance. Second, there are the false negatives that are governments committing 
in principle but which fail to ratify. And finally, some governments are strategic ratifiers, that 
ratify because other countries have ratified, and they want to avoid criticism. Simmons 
(2009:58) states that the United States serve as a good example of the second category. While 
the United States tends to commit, is fails to comply. The American ratification of the 
Genocide Convention proves Simmons’ claim of the United States as a false negative. While 
the Genocide Convention was established in 1948, the United States ratified as late as 1988 
when Senate finally passed the Convention (Power, 2002:167). The Genocide Convention 
was from 1948 debated in Congress in terms of possible reservations, which Senator William 
Proxmire lobbied against. After Lemkin’s death, Proxmire continued his work by taking the 
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floor in Senate every day from 1967 to 1986 in order to have the United States to ban 
genocide and adapt the convention. Finally in 1988, all the lobbying resulted in the American 
ratification. Simmons’s argument of the United States as a false negative can to some extend 
be explained in American exceptionalism.  
Exceptionalism serves as an elementary element, which has long tradition in the 
American self-perception and its role in the world (Melby, 1995:20). The essence is that the 
United States, its political system and its people represent something unique, and that the 
United States has a special responsibility in the world. Svein Melby (1995:15) states that in 
almost no other country than the United States is there such a strong element of idealism, and 
such a special relationship between idealism and realism, which shape its foreign policy. The 
American approach towards foreign policy is to a large extends influenced by the symbiosis 
between idealism and realism (Melby, 1995:31). Melby (1995:20) further claims that in order 
to understand the special role that idealism plays in the American approach to foreign policy, 
American exceptionalism should be taken into account. Exceptionalism is divided into the 
two camps of sense of escape and manifest destiny. The first, sense of escape, presents the 
United States as a “city upon a hill”. As a city upon the hill, the United States has served as 
place that people have searched to for freedom and new opportunities. A foreign policy 
approach influenced by “sense of escape” ideas is introvert and defensive. On the other side, a 
foreign policy approach influenced by ideas of manifest destiny is extrovert and offensive. 
The idea of manifest destiny is that the United States has to avoid other ideological ideas or 
great power from taking over. The United States should therefore act as a “missionary” actor 
in order to spread American ideas and values (Melby, 1995, 78-80). 
By studying the United States in terms of ideational explanations, it is important to be 
aware of the unique role that idealism plays in its system. A study of ideational explanations 
makes it possible to study the American attitudes towards genocide. Since my aim is to study 





2.3 Structural explanation  
According to a structural explanation, people choose their actions as a direct function of what 
is taken to be a concrete, exogenously given environment (Parsons, 2007:52).  Parsons 
(2007:39) suggest that “structural” is used to designate any claim that explains actions as an 
individual-rational function of position in a “material” landscape. The theories of Marxism, 
economic liberalism and realism can be defined as structural explanations (Parsons:2007:61). 
These three rational theories have major differences, but their debates concern the 
configuration and dynamics of the given landscape, and not the basic logic of action (Parsons, 
2007:39). There are in other words external factors that explain action. Of the three theories, 
realism, or real politics, has by far been the most influential theory because it provides the 
most powerful explanation for the state of war, which is the regular condition of life in the 
international system (Baylis&Smith, 2005:161).  
The origin of realism can be tracked back to Thrucydides and Hobbes who presented 
power politics as a law of human behavior (Baylis&Smith, 2005:167). They shared a 
pessimistic view of the human nature, and considered uncertainly and conflicts to challenge 
states’ goal of survival. The endless struggle for power has its roots in human nature 
(Baylis&Smith, 2005:166). Classic realism was further developed in terms of Machiavelli, 
E.H. Carr and Hans J. Morgenthau who also concerned about the human nature, but 
additionally applied power interests. International politics can be understood through the 
concept of interests, defined in terms of power. Structural realism (neo-realism) rose as a 
critic to the neo-classical assumption of human nature as the explaining factor of power 
politic. In 1979, Kenneth Waltz outlined neo-realism in Theory of International Politics. 
Waltz was in favor of a structural explanation to international politics, and argued that the 
international structure constrains state behaviour. There is the distribution of power that 
explains the structure of the international system. Structural realists can further be divided 
into a defensive and offensive orientation. While Kenneth Waltz, who represents the 
defensive side concerns on the international structure, offensive realists such as John 
Mearsheimer focus more on power maximation. Offensive realism states that because states 
are not satisfied with a given amount of power, they seek hegemony for security and survival. 
Among the most current development within realism is neo-classical realism, which serves as 
a combination of classical- and neo-realism. The logic of neo-classical realism “places 
domestic politics as an intervening variable between the distribution of power and foreign 
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policy behavior” (Walt, 2001:170). Despite important differences between classical-, 
structural- and neo-classical realism, it is possible to identify a shared core set of assumptions 
and ideas (Baylis&Smith, 2005:161). Mearsheimer (2001:30-31) has provided such core in 
terms of five assumptions: 
1. The international system is anarchic 
2. The great powers inherently possess some offensive military capability 
3. States can never be certain about the intension of other states 
4. Survival is the primary goal of all states 
5. All states are rational actors 
Summed up, realism considers external factors to determine the action of states. States are 
rational actors, which handle from a perspective where cost and benefit are calculated in terms 
of power and security. A study of structural explanations, here presented in terms of realism, 
allows exploring whether the given structure influenced the American practice towards 
genocide. In a process of evaluating a possible intervention, a state has to take into account 
whether it will promote its national interests. It is therefore not just ideational conditions that 
should be addressed, but also the regional conditions. By looking at both structural and 
ideational explanations, I will explore whether the American practice towards Bosnia and 
Darfur were influenced by an anarchic system where the United States acted rational in order 
to secure its own interests, or if the normative aspect influenced more? I have so far provided 
an introduction to the essence of structural and ideational explanations, but the explanations 
should be operationalized in order to better fit my study. I will do so in the next section.  
 
2.4 Operationalization of the theory  
2.4.1 Ideational explanation operationalized  
International law and norms. By international law and norms, I mean laws and norms, 
which concern about genocide, and that were present at the time of the conflicts in Bosnia and 
Darfur. International law governs relations between states, and norms have already been 
presented as standard of appropriate behavior for actors with a given identity (Finnemore and 
Sikkink, 1998:891). First of all, the Genocide Convention was established in 1948 and 
14 
 
therefore present at both the times of Bosnia and Darfur. In the 1990, humanitarian 
intervention became the new norm in conflict prevention, and as a follow up R2P was created 
in 2001. R2P was further consolidated an international norm in 2005. While the Genocide 
Convention was present at the time of both Bosnia and Darfur, the norm of humanitarian 
intervention and R2P were only present at the time of Darfur in 2004, and therefore not at the 
time of Bosnia in 1995. There can be debated whether R2P developed prior to Darfur. R2P 
was first consolidated as an international norm in 2005, but it was already in 2011 established 
in a report by the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS). 
Based on such argument, I state that R2P was present at the time of Darfur. While the 
Genocide Convention has already been presented, I will now provide a brief introduction of 
R2P.  
Responsibility to Protect (R2P) 
R2P is an international security and human rights norm with the objective to address the 
international community’s failure to prevent and stop genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, 
and crimes against humanity. The International Commission on Intervention and State 
Sovereignty (ICISS) bases the origin of R2P on a report in 20015. ICISS started its work to 
develop R2P because of the increased focus on humanitarian interventions in ethnic conflicts 
that developed throughout the 1990s. The aim of R2P is to change the terms of the debate 
from a “right to intervene” to a “responsibility to protect” (ICISS, 2001:18).  R2P has, with 
regard to genocide, changed the 1990s defensive approach of standing idly by, to an increased 
focus on responsibilities of prevention, reaction and rebuilding. The refusal to prevent and 
stop genocide in the 1990s can be explained in the expectations of the international structure 
that intervention was only necessary in situations where the term genocide was used. There 
was a belief that as long as the term genocide was not taken in use, there were no expectations 
or obligations on the international community to intervene.  
R2P consists of the three elements of prevention, reaction and rebuilding (ICISS, 
2001:XI). R2P is currently an international standard to guide states, and it intends to change 
the international focus to increased awareness of certain expectations that are related to 
humanitarian crisis, such as genocide. A main goal of the R2P is to move the international 
community from a “culture of reaction” to a “culture of prevention” (ICISS, 2001:27). This is 
based on humanitarian, social and economic arguments which all argue that prevention is 
                                                
5 For the report Responsibility to Protect by ICISS, see: http://www.iciss.ca/report-en.asp 
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more beneficial than a reaction towards genocide. In September 2005, in paragraph 138 and 
139 of the World Summit Outcome Document at the UN, R2P was established as an 
international norm. By doing so, the UN lived up to the promise of UN General Secretary 
Kofi Annan at the international day of reflection on the genocide in Rwanda in April 2004 to 
make prevention of genocide a priority6. R2P has increased the international awareness of 
prevention of genocide, but it is mainly considered a Western phenomena. Anders Kjølberg 
(2006:17) argues that there is an opposition between the Western World’s implementation of 
democracy and humanitarian interventions when human rights are at stake, and the resistance 
from the rest of the World against such policy. Kjølberg (2006:7) states that African states 
tend to consider the Western policy as colonialism and “new-imperialism”. While the 
Western World tends to be more positive oriented towards international law and norms, states 
in Africa and also the Middle East are more careful to comply with such ideas since they 
often tend to be more directly affected by them. International law and norms put obligations 
and responsibility upon states to react toward crimes against humanity, and such crimes are 
most likely to be found in African and Middle Eastern states.  
2.4.2 Structural explanation operationalized  
In order to explore whether the American attitudes and practice towards genocide is 
determined by the structure, I will look at two factors; 
The size of the abuses. By addressing the size of the abuses, I will study the conflicts in 
Bosnia and Darfur in terms of how long the conflicts lasted, the crimes that were committed, 
the number of victims, and whether or not the crimes were defined genocide. While Darfur 
became the first time that an on-going crisis was defined as genocide, the crimes being 
committed in Srebrenica was first defined as genocide in the aftermath. 
The international setting. By the international setting, I mean how the United States’ 
position in the international system determined its behaviour towards Bosnia and Darfur. At 
both the time of Bosnia and Darfur, the United States served as the global hegemony. 
Brzezinski (1997:10) argues that the collapse of the Soviet Union left the United States as the 
first and only truly global power. He (1997:21) further claims that historically the Roman-, 
the Chinese-, and the Mongol empires, additionally to the European great powers of Spain, 
                                                




France and Great Britain have all served as hegemony, but they were only regional 
hegemony. The United States is the first global hegemony because it stands supreme in the 
four decisive domains of global power: militarily, economically, technologically and 
culturally (Brzezinski, 1997:24). With the position as a global hegemony, the United States 
had ability to intervene and stop the two conflicts, but there was not consensus among the 
political elite on whether to intervene, or how to intervene towards Bosnia and Darfur. While 
it is important to keep in mind the American role as a global hegemony, for this thesis, the 
regional aspect is of more interest. It is the American addressing of the regions of Balkan and 
Africa that is of interest. 
The United States was a global hegemony, but there were other actors present in the 
international system, which played important roles at the times of Bosnia and Darfur. With 
regards to Bosnia, the European powers played a significant role by its unsuccessful attempt 
to stop the crisis prior to the American led NATO intervention in 1995. And with regards to 
Darfur, the great powers of China and Russia in addition to European powers also had 
interests in Sudan in 2004. The United States had to act in a way that maintained its interests, 
and its position in the international system. In order to understand the American response to 
the crisis in Darfur, it is also important to study the whole Sudanese conflict. The interests of 
other great powers additionally to regional challenges concerning local actors and the internal 
conflicts in Sudan might have influenced the American response to define Darfur. The 
genocide in Darfur was only one element of the conflict in Sudan.  
In addition, to structural and ideational explanations, others factors should also be 
addressed in this study of the American attitudes and response to genocide. I will therefore in 
the next section present some intervening variables. These intervening variables might have 
influenced the structural explanations and the ideational explanations, and therefore have 
influenced the American attitudes and response to genocide.  
2.4.3 Intervening variables 
In addition to look at ideational explanation in terms of the presence of international law and 
norms, and structural explanation in terms of the size of the abuses, and the international 
setting, I will address a couple more factors that might have influenced the American attitudes 
and practice towards genocide. Those factors are lobbying, the role of media, and the political 
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actors in Bosnia and Darfur at the time of the crisis. These factors might have served as 
intervening factors that influenced American attitudes and action.  
1. Lobbying. Lobbying is the attempts to influence decisions. For this thesis, there are 
particular two kinds of influencing forces and lobbying that should be addressed. First of all, 
there were some members of Congress who repeatedly stood up to speak for increased 
American involvement in both Bosnia and Darfur. Secondly, there were NGOs and grass 
roots organizations that were actively involved in lobbying the American Congress and the 
President to take action. For this thesis, it is especially the second factor, the role of NGOs 
and other organizations that are of interest, but it is important to keep in mind that some 
representatives intensively tried to influence the American responses towards Bosnia and 
Darfur.   
2. The role of media The political role of mass media can be divided into “agenda-setting” 
and framing (Sidahmed, Soderlund&Briggs, 2010:45). While “agenda-setting” is the ability to 
establish the importance of events and problems in the mind of the mass public by coverage, 
framing is the way in which particular events or problems are presented in mass media 
reporting and is significant for the way mass public interpret (Sidahmed, Soderlund&Briggs, 
2010:45-46). The linkage between media coverage and public opinion is important, 
because…”what we know about the world is circumscribed by what the media are able to tell 
us- and choose to tell us” (Sidahmed, Soderlund&Briggs, 2010:45). In war and conflicts, 
media tends to side with the victims, which again means that the public will choose side and 
further call upon its political elite to intervene. Piers Robison (2002) has coined the term 
”empathy framing”, reflecting media coverage that is likely to sympathy for crisis victims and 
to pressure Western governments to intervene.  
3. The political situation in Bosnia and Darfur. By studying the political situation at the 
time of the crisis in Bosnia and Darfur, I address the famous American political saying that 
“all politic is local”7. I will address local actors attempt to influence the international 
response. The aim is to get an understanding of how authorities and victims in Bosnia and 
Darfur lobbied and worked since local actors often tend to lobby their interests in a 
manipulating way in order to trigger a response. While the Bosnian Muslims lobbied their 
                                                
7 The former U.S. Speaker of the House Thomas "Tip" O'Neill coined this phrase when asked to describe how 




case to trigger a Western intervention, the Sudanese Government considered a possible 
intervention to be colonialism or imperialism. Such factors certainly influence the American 
policy-making, and decisions on whether or not to intervene in the regional conflicts.  
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3 Research design 
A methodical challenge is to justify for the choice of research methods. Liphart (1975:173) 
argues that the “suitability as research methods depends on the research problem”. In the next 
section, I will argue for why a comparative case study and document analysis will serve as the 
best tools to answer my research question.  
3.1 Research methods 
In order to study American attitude and practice towards genocide, I will rely on a qualitative 
research design. Qualitative research tends to “focus on one or a small number of cases, to use 
intensive interviews or depth analysis of historical materials, to be discursive in method and 
to be concerned with a rounded or comprehensive account of some event or unit” (Keohane, 
Verba and King, 1994:4). Qualitative research tends to be concerned with words rather than 
numbers (Bryman, 2004:266). In addition to being narrow and focused on words, qualitative 
researchers are concerned about process rather than static factors (Bryman, 2004:287). My 
concern is on the political process that led up to the American practice towards Bosnia and 
Darfur.  In order to study and compare the political processes in Bosnia and Darfur, I will as 
data rely on documents. Data are “systematically collected elements of information about the 
world” (Keohane, Verba and King, 1994:23). Relevant data will be officially released 
documents by the American Congress, the State Department and the American Presidency. 
Together, these actors make up the American political elite. 
 The reliance on more than one method in the study of a phenomenon is called method 
triangulation (Bryman, 2004:275). A major strength of case study data collection is the 
opportunity to use many different sources of evidence (Yin, 1994:91). This is a strength 
because “any finding or conclusion in a case study is likely to be much more convincing and 
accurate if it is based on several different sources of information” (Yin, 1994:92). A challenge 
related to methodological triangulation is that it tends to be more expensive, and additionally, 
it requires that the researcher has the necessarily knowledge on how to carry out all the data 
collection. On the other hand, methodological triangulation has the advantage of ensuring a 
valid research project. It ensures construct validity because “multiple sources of evidence 
essentially provide measures of the same phenomenon” (Yin, 1994:92). I will now move into 
looking at comparative case study and document analysis. 
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3.1.1  Comparative case study of Bosnia and Darfur 
In according to George and Bennett (2005:151), comparative methods “involve the non 
statistical comparative analysis of a small number of cases”. A relevant question is therefore, 
what is a small number of cases? Gerring (2007:21) argues that in a case study, the sample is 
small, consisting of the single case or a handful of cases. In other words, the definition of a 
comparative case study provided by Gerring (2007) is not too different from how George and 
Bennett (2005) choose to define a case study. Both Gerring (2007) and George and Bennett 
(2007) rely on the study of a few cases, which means that the distinction between a case study 
and a comparative study is blurry. Lijphart (1971:691) even states that a case study should be 
closely connected to the comparative method. In addition to a diffuse distinction between the 
comparative and case study methods, Lijphart (1975:24) argues that there is “no clear 
dividing line between the statistical and comparative methods”. The methods of case study, 
comparative and statistical studies share many similarities, but for this thesis, I will rely on 
the definition of comparative research provided by George and Bennett (2005:151). 
Comparative case study is the study of a small number of cases. By studying Bosnia and 
Darfur, two cases are compared, which justify for calling this study a comparative case study. 
Lijphart (1975:172) argues that an advantage of comparative case study is that by analyzing a 
small number of cases, “one can be more attentive to details”. This will again verify that 
concepts are not stretched, and that data are reliable. 
 First of all, it is important to justify for why the two cases of Bosnia and Darfur have 
been selected. A logical first explanation is that due to a limited time frame, I am not capable 
of studying all cases that have either been defined, or considering being defined as genocide8. 
I have already stated that the definition of genocide is diffuse, and that a political definition 
tends to classify more cases as genocide than the legal definition. In the aftermath of the 
Holocaust, certain governments around the World have conducted genocide crimes against its 
people, but with a limited time frame, I am not capable of comparing all these cases. A 
challenge is therefore to select relevant cases, and I have chosen to limit my study to Bosnia 
and Darfur, which serves as good representatives for pre- and post-cases of developments on 
humanitarian intervention that took place in the 1990s. It makes it possible to study whether 
the United States has become more committed to international law and norms on genocide, or 
                                                
8 For more see; Power, Samantha (2002), A Problem from Hell, America and the Age of Genocide. Harper 




if there are structural factors that still determine its attitudes and action. Additionally, the two 
cases of Bosnia and Darfur have been chosen because of their interesting differences. While 
Darfur was defined as genocide, Srebrenica was only defined genocide ten years after it took 
place. While the United States intervened in Bosnia, it did not intervene in Darfur. And 
additionally, the two conflicts occurred in different regions of the world. 
  The fact that both Bosnia (Srebrenica) and Darfur have been classified as genocide 
make it possible to determine whether there has been a shift in how the United States 
addresses genocide without doing a mistake of defining a case as genocide that should not be 
defined as genocide. While the United States officially defined Darfur as genocide on 
September 9, 2004, it was first in the aftermath of the war that the crimes, which had been 
committed in Srebrenica, were defined as genocide. In 2004, the ICTY condemned the crimes 
committed in Srebrenica in 1995 as an act of genocide (Honig, 2009:192). On April 19, 2004 
in the "Prosecutor v. Krstić" case, ICTY concluded that genocide had been committed against 
Bosnian Muslims in Srebrenica in July of 19959. In 2007, the International Court of Justice 
(ICJ) followed up and defined the crimes committed in Srebrenica as genocide10.  
 George and Bennett (2005:83) states that case selection “should be an integral part of a 
good research strategy to achieve well-defined objectives of the study”. Case selection should 
be done in a way that maximizes the variation in the concepts, and variables that is of interests 
for the study (Andersen, 1997:15). Cases should be chosen for representativeness and causal 
leverage (Gerring, 2007:88). While the factor of representativeness refers to that selected 
cases should represent the larger universe, causal leverage means that cases should provide 
variation along the dimensions of theoretical interest. During the 1990s, humanitarian 
intervention became the new norm in conflict prevention, and Bosnia and Darfur represents 
pre- and post cases of this. In the aftermath of the Cold War, there developed an increased 
focus on the emergence of new conflicts, and on conflict prevention. During the 1990s, 
humanitarian intervention became the new norm in prevention of conflicts (Finnemore, 1996). 
The original idea is that sovereign states are expected to act as guardians of their citizens’ 
security (Wheeler&Bellamy, 2005:556), but unfortunately, some states violate the 
responsibility to take care of their own civilians, and the international community becomes 
responsible to act. During the 1990s, there developed a belief that the international 
community was obligated to act towards states and governments that abused or killed their 
                                                
9 In order to read the ICTY case, see: http://www.icty.org/x/cases/krstic/acjug/en/krs-aj040419e.pdf 
 
10 In order to read the ICJ case, see: http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/91/13685.pdf 
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own civilians. However, the idea tended to fail in practice. The most obvious example is 
Rwanda. Within two and a half months of the spring of 1994, 800, 000 Tutsis were 
slaughtered down by the Hutu population. While people were slaughtered in Rwanda, the 
world chose to stand idly by as no states wanted to take the necessarily lead of a humanitarian 
intervention. Even though humanitarian intervention was the new norm in conflict prevention, 
the international community failed to implement it on Rwanda. The norm of humanitarian 
intervention failed to live up to the promise of “never again”. On background of the weak 
willingness to intervene in situations where certain Governments abused Article 51 of the UN 
Charter, ICISS developed its report “Responsibility to Protect”. Bosnia and Darfur serve as 
good representatives of cases that occurred before and after development in international law 
on how to address genocide. Representativeness is ensured. The next factor to address is 
whether a case selection of Bosnia and Darfur lead to causal leverage by providing variation 
along the dimensions of theoretical interest. I have already presented the theoretical 
framework and showed how addressing a variety of explanatory factors will make it possible 
to study the American attitude and practice towards genocide. Causal leverage is therefore 
also ensured.  
3.1.2 Document analysis to track the political processes 
towards Bosnia and Darfur 
In order to study the American practice towards Bosnia and Darfur, I will study the two 
political processes that led up to a refusal to call Bosnia genocide in 1995, and the use of the 
genocide definition towards Darfur in 2004. Relevant data for spotting these political 
processes will be political documents, and decisions taken by the American political elite. For 
this study, I chose to only focus on the political elite since they are the one who take the final 
political decisions. By the American political elite, I mean Congress and the administration 
that is presented through the departments, and the Presidency. With regards to the 
departments, it is mainly the State Department and the Defence Department that are of 
relevance. 
 Documents are “physically embodied texts, where the containment of the text is the 
primary purpose of the physical medium” (Scott, 2006: 15). Scott (2006:8-9) claims that an 
effective use of documents requires that the four criteria of authenticity, credibility, 
representativeness and meaning have been met. The last criteria, meaning, is the most 
important and fundamental element because the purpose of examining documents is “to arrive 
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at an understanding of the meaning and significance of what the document contains” (Scott, 
2006:32). The purpose of text analysis is to understand the content, and to analyze the 
meaning of the text (Feiring, 2009). While in text analysis, the main purpose is to analyze 
specific texts; in discourse analysis the language is the most central factor to study (Bergstrom 
and Boreus, 2005). For this study, I am more concerned about the specific texts than the 
language. I am not interested in the specific language, but rather in the meaning of the text.  
3.1.3 Sources for the text analysis 
Relevant documents to study were official documents and statements from political debates in 
the American Congress. To find such documents were not difficult since “documents 
produced by governmental authorities, both nation and local, comprise the single largest class 
of documents available to the social researcher” (Scott, 2006:18). A main challenge was 
instead to limit my study to use the most relevant documents 
 In order to get a good picture of the political debates on Bosnia and Darfur, I have 
looked at Congressional Records, Congressional Hearings, and Public Papers of the President. 
In addition, I have studied bills and resolutions that were debated and passed concerning the 
two conflicts. Congressional Records are the official records of the proceedings and debates 
of the United States Congress. Congressional Hearings are records of testimonies that are 
given before congressional committees, and Public Papers of the President are the official 
published public writing, addresses and remarks of the American president. Additionally, and 
in order, to get an improved picture of the American situation, I have also studied the UN 
resolutions that were of relevance to the United States’ action towards Bosnia and Darfur. 
Due to the many documents that address the American practice towards genocide, I had to 
limit my study to some of them. I have been relying on Library of Congress’s THOMAS 
website, and the U.S Government Printing Office (GPO). While the THOMAS website 
provided me with Congressional Records and passed bills and resolutions, GPO’s website 
provided Congressional Hearings and Public Papers of the President. McCulloch (2004) states 
that online, or what he also refers to as virtual documents, can change the definition of 
documentation. Instead of travelling to get access to archives, the Internet allows for easy 
access to documents. This is an advantage, but at the same time it is important to be critical. 
An element to be aware of is that when government have established their own website there 
are lots of information, and the information that it provides tends to cast the department and 
its ministers in a favourable light (McCulloch, 2004:39). Another challenge to keep in mind is 
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that all documents might not be published, or that there sometimes might be limited access. I 
realized this when no matches appeared in the search for “Srebrenica” in Congressional 
Hearings for 1995. It appears that the GPO’s website does not have a complete collection of 
Congressional Hearings from 1995. In order to do a comprehensive search to see if there were 
any hearings on “Srebrenica” in 1995, I had to search in Lexis Congressional, which is a 
subscription database that is not available to the free Internet. All this information, I got from 
the Digital Reference Section at the Library of Congress. In order to overcome challenges of 
finding the right documents, I have contacted the Library of Congress that has provided me 
with constructive help and information. 
 Since my focus is on the political debates that lead up to the fall of Srebrenica in July 
1995, and the decision to define Darfur genocide on September 9, 2004, I limited my search 
in Congressional Records to the 104th Congress (1995-1996), and the 108th Congress (2003- 
2004). Especially with regards to Bosnia was such limitation important. The Bosnian War 
lasted from 1992 to 1995, which means three Congresses and many documents. I therefore 
choose to limit my search to “Srebrenica”, and not “Bosnia”. But with that being said, I also 
looked at some of the debates that took place in the 103rd Congress. This was in order to get 
some background, but the focus was mainly on the 104th Congress. With regards to 
Congressional Hearings and Public Papers of the President, I limited my search to the time 
frame from January 1, 1995 to December 31, 1995 with regards to Bosnia/Srebrenica, and 
January 1, 2004 to December 31, 2004 with regards to Darfur. 
 At the same time as documents and statements were used as primary sources, already 
existing literature serves as secondary sources. I have already stated that much is written in 
the field of genocide, and I relied on such literature for improved knowledge and background 
information. 
3.1.4 Validity and reliability 
Cook and Campbell (1979) have developed a validity system consisting of the four 
requirements of, statistical conclusion validity, internal validity, construct validity and 
external validity. Since statistical conclusion validity concerns whether the statistical contexts 
are significant and strong, and I am doing a qualitative study, it will not be of relevance here. 
Construct validity, on the other side, is relevant for this study since it focuses on whether the 
variables measure the relevant concepts of the research question. The solution to construct 
validity is secured through a good operationalization. A good operationalization ensures that 
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the theoretical concepts and the operationalized concept measure the same. For this study, it 
was important to operationalize Craig Parsons’s structural and ideational explanations so it 
applied to my study of the American practice towards genocide. Internal validity is if the 
context is causal, while external validity concerns on the ability to generate findings to the 
universe (Lund, 2002:107). Case studies tend to score higher on internal validity than on 
external validity (Gerring: 2007:43) This study provides a high level of reliability because of 
its reliance of officially released and published documents and statements by the American 
Congress, American Presidency and the United Nations. Since the documents are easy to 
access, it should be relatively easy for others to control my study.  It is also important to 
empathize that case studies are often criticized for a lack of statistical representativeness, 
which threatens the opportunities for generalization (Andersen, 1997:14). Generalization is 






4 Empirical part 
In this chapter, I will study the American attitudes and responses towards Bosnia in 1995 and 
Darfur in 2004. A variety of explanatory factors will be addressed. First of all, structural 
explanations will be addressed in terms of the two conflicts and the international settings. 
Then, ideational explanations will be studied in terms of the presence and importance of 
international law. Lastly, I address lobbying, the role of media and local politics, which might 
have served as intervening variables to influence the American attitudes and responses. Each 
section will provide a discussion of both Bosnia and Darfur, before it ends with a brief 
comparison in order to conclude whether there has been a shift in the American attitudes and 
responses.  
4.1 Structural explanations 
I have earlier operationalized structural explanations to the size of the conflicts and the 
international settings. In the next section, these two factors will be addressed.  
4.1.1 The conflict in Bosnia 
A brief introduction to the Bosnian War 1992-1995 
In July 1995, Srebrenica, a town located in the Eastern part of Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
became the scene for some of the worst violence committed during the Bosnian War (1992-
1995). The UN had already on September 25, 1991 expressed deep concerns about the 
situation in Bosnia by passing S/RES/713 that implemented embargo on all deliveries of 
weapons and military equipment to Yugoslavia. The Bosnians were disarmed, with a promise 
that they would be safe and protected by the international community. The problem was that 
as the conflict intensified, Bosnian Muslims were not able to defend themselves against 
increased Serb aggression, and the UN also failed to protect civilians. The Serbs had the 
military advantage. In addition to have the military officers, The Serb side also took over the 
military equipment. Milosevic continued the policy that he had adapted in the 1980s to seize 
control of Serbian political structures in order to, “assume the leadership of a growing Serb 
nationalist movement that cut across republic boundaries, including those of Bosnia-
Herzegovina” (Burg&Shoup, 1999:44). In the aftermath of the collapse of the Communist 
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regime and the dissolution of Yugoslavia, nationalistic oriented political leaders, like 
Milosevic had taken over. These leaders shared an old-fashioned Balkan belief that in order to 
seize control, territorial control was not enough. Also ethnic homogeneity was necessary 
(Mønnesland, 2009:348). 
  The Bosnian War (1992-1995) was in other words a result of the ethnical conflicts that 
emerged with the dissolution of Yugoslavia in the early 1990s. In the aftermath of a 
referendum in February 1992, Bosnia declared its independence in March 1992. At the time 
of the Bosnian referendum, the ethnic composition of Bosnia was 43% Muslims, 31% Serbs, 
and 17% Croats (Mønnesland, 2009:353). In order to secure Serbian territory, the Bosnian 
Serbs rejected the Bosnian referendum, and following the declaration of Bosnian 
independence in 1992, Bosnian Serb forces attacked the Bosnian Muslims. One of the first 
steps taken was to siege the capital Sarajevo, which lasted from April 1992 to February 1996. 
The war was mainly a conflict between Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croat on the one side, 
and Bosnian Serbs on the other. Events such as the siege of Sarajevo and the massacre in 
Srebrenica have become iconic of the conflict. Since I limit my study to the incident of 
Srebrenica, I will now briefly introduce the fatal massacre that occurred in July 1995.  
Srebrenica- “blood up to your knee”  
On May 6, 1993, the UN, still deeply concerned about the conflict in Bosnia, passed 
S/RES/824, declaring Srebrenica, Sarajevo, Tuzla, Zepa, Gorazde and Bihac to be treated as 
safe areas, but increased involvement by the international community was not enough to stop 
the Serb aggression. On May 24, 1995, the French General Janvier had warned the UN 
Security Council that none of the safe areas were defensible (Gallagher, 2003:157). On July 6 
1995, Serbian General R. Mladic announced that, “there will be blood up to your knees” 
(Jones, 2006:218), and on 11 July 1995, Bosnian Serbs launched a carefully prepared attack 
on Srebrenica. Within the next few days 8,000 Bosnian Muslims men was killed. In addition 
to the large number of causalities, Srebrenica, and the Bosnian War in general, offered one of 
the most vivid modern instances of gendercide, or gender selective mass killing (Jones, 
2006:216). In Srebrenica, men were separated from women and children, and while women 
and children were deported, men were murdered. Additionally, many died in the countryside. 
Expecting a massacre once Srebrenica fell, there were many Bosnian Muslims who tried to 
escape, but most of them were hunted down (Gallagher, 2003: 158). Srebrenica is recognized 
among the worst single war crimes committed in Europe since Second World War. It became 
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the one of the worst slaughter in Europe since killings of political opponents by Yugoslav 
partisan forces after Second World War (Jones, 2006:219). In addition to be characterized as 
the one of the worst single war crime, Srebrenica has become synonymous with a great failure 
of the international community (Honig, 2009:192).  It became the final defeat in the Bosnian 
War for the UN that failed to protect the civil population against massacre (Mønnesland, 
2009:355). In the summer and fall of 1995, the UN passed three resolutions, S/RES/1004, 
S/RES 1010 and S/RES 1016, to express its concerns for the innocent civilians, and 
demanded withdrawal of Serb forces from the safe areas. But they were passed too late as 
8,000 had already been killed in Srebrenica. During the Srebreica massacre, the UN 
peacekeepers only adapted an obervational position. Comiteau (2011) argues that, 
”outnumbered and poorly equipped, Dutch U.N. peacekeepers, or Dutchbat, bowed to General 
Ratko Mladic's demands and forced the many Muslim families who had sought refuge on 
their base out of the compound”. In the aftermath of the massacre, the Dutch state has argued 
that because its troops were serving under the auspices of the U.N. during the Bosnian war, 
the Netherlands could not be held responsible for its action (Comiteau, 2011) 
 Srebrenica fell “because of a lack of will on the part of the international community to 
use force in defense of human rights” (Honig, 2009:194). In the aftermath of the shock of 
Srebrenica, the great powers with the United States in lead took over the international 
involvement in Bosnia. This led to the NATO’s bombing, code-named Operation Deliberate 
Force in the fall of 1995, and the Dayton agreement in December 1995. The Serbian ethnic 
cleansing was not a result of threats, but rather due to planned and conscious politics 
(Mønnesland, 2009:352). In according to Honig (2009:193), Srebrenica is a clear instance of 
the strategy of ethnic cleansing practiced by the Serbs since 1991.  
 Srebrenica was the only massacre that in the aftermath of the Bosnian War was found to 
be genocide. In 2004, ICTY (case no: IT-98-33- A: Prosecutor v. Krstić) stated that crime 
committed by the Serbs against Bosnian Muslims in Srebrenica was genocide. ICJ followed 
up by declaring the same in 2007 in case 91; Application of the Convention on the Prevention 
and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide. In 2005, the United States passed S.RES 134 and 
H.RES 199, stating that the Serbs policy of aggression met the terms of being defined as 
genocide. The two resolutions were passed at the ten years anniversary of the Srebrenica 
massacre in order to honor the victims. The summaries of the two resolutions are identical, 
and claim that the United States and the UN should accept their responsibility for allowing the 
massacre in Srebrenica to occur, and further seek to ensure that it would not happen in the 
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future. Ten years later, in 2004, the crisis in Darfur caught the world’s attention.  
4.1.2 The conflict in Darfur 
In Darfur, conflicts have historically been between two groups, the Arabs and the African 
agriculturalists. The conflicts of 2003 and 2004, which lead up to the genocide were not of 
any exceptions. Samuel Totten (2009:198) claims that the genocide in Darfur in 2004 was 
caused by factors of extreme drought, increased desertification, Arab supremacism, 
authoritarianism, extreme nationalism, an ever-increasing bellicosity in the region, and 
disenfranchisement of black Africans at the hands of the Sudanese government. The extreme 
drought in the early 2000s resulted in Arabs taking over land that had originally been used by 
various African tribal groups for agriculture. As a result of reduced agricultural production, 
there was a decrease in food supplies. The African agriculturalists were not just taken away 
their source of income. They also started to suffer from starvation. Due to the hopeless 
situation, feelings of marginalization, invasion and exploitation developed within the black 
African population (Jones, 2006:252). People were hungry, tired and let with no hope for the 
future. On background of this, the Sudanese Liberation Movement/Army (SLM/A) and the 
Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) attacked the Sudanese government (GOS), led by 
President Omar al-Bashir. On March 2003, SLM/A announced that “the brutal oppression, 
ethnic cleansing and genocide sponsored by the Khartoum government left the people of 
Darfur with no other option but to resort to popular political and military resistance for 
purposes of survival” (Totten, 2009:203). The Sudan Liberation Army/Movement (SLM/A) 
was the more important of the two groups in terms of numbers, military capabilities and 
popular support. The movement’s leaders came from the educated elite who fought for 
improved power and influence in Khartoum. SLA/M was fighting on behalf of all the 
marginalized people in Darfur. JEM, the other group that attached the government in 2003, 
was created by Darfurian Islamist intellectuals. Just like SLM/A, JEM also aimed for 
increased political influence and to pressure the Governments for its failed promises of equity 
and prosperity in Sudan. The two rebel groups acted in concert against the government during 
the crisis in Darfur, although remained wary of each other and never integrated politically or 
militarily (Whitty, 2008:23-24). While Al-Bashir and his government responded by attacking 




The world’s worst humanitarian catastrophe  
From March 2003, “Janjaweed” and troops of the Sudanese government slaughtered men and 
boys, raped, mutilated and often killed females, looted household goods and animals, and then 
burned homes and villages” (Totten, 2009: 204). Jan Egeland, then the UN Under- Secretary 
General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator, declared that the Darfur 
region was probably the world’s worst humanitarian catastrophe”11. The GOS has tended to 
blame the Janjaweed for being responsible by repeatedly denying that its troops have taken 
part in actions against the black Africans of Darfur, but evidence indicates that the vast 
majority of the attacks have been carried out in a coalition of the two. Totten (2009:196) 
states that, the GOS often hired the Janjaweed. A survey of Sudanese refugees conducted by 
an U.S State Department Atrocities Documentation Team in the summer of 2004 proved that 
a majority of the victims considered both the Janjaweed and the Government of Sudan as 
perpetrators. 
 Between 2003 and 2007, the international community has worked in various ways 
though hardly effective ways to bring the Darfur crisis to a close (Totten, 2009:207). The 
international community has met obstacles in their work to prevent and improve the 
humanitarian situation since the Government of Sudan has shown little willingness to 
cooperate. The United States officially declared Darfur as genocide on September 9, 2004. In 
the aftermath of Darfur being defined as genocide, steps have been taken to stop the crisis. 
The African Union (AU) was allowed to deploy a small ceasefire monitoring team in Sudan, 
but the AU troops were outmanned and outgunned (Totten, 2009:207). In July 2007, Sudan 
allowed the UN special force, UNAMID, into Darfur. 
 
4.1.3 A comparison between the conflicts  
 In both Bosnia and Darfur men and boys were slaughtered. Women were raped. 
Families were split, and villages and houses burnt. Within only a few days in July 1995, Serb 
forces killed 8000 Bosnian Muslim men. In Darfur, at least 200,000 were killed (Kjølberg, 
2006:24). A comparison of the victims could mean that the size of the abuses were larger in 
Darfur, but at the same time it is important to keep in mind that for this research project, I 
have limited my study to the massacre of Srebrenica. The massacre of Srebrenica lasted for 
                                                
11 Jan Egeland in a statement to "The World," BBC/Public Radio International, December 18, 2003. 
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only a few days, while the Bosnian War lasted for three years. A study of the whole Bosnian 
War would have given a higher number of causalities than 8000 in Srebrenica. It is also 
important to state that the numbers of causalities in Bosnia and Darfur have been debated. In 
2002, the International Peace Research Institute (PRIO) concluded that at least 7475 persons 
have been reported as missing and are presumed dead after the fall of the Srebrenica enclave 
on 11 July 1995 (Brundahl, Lyngstad&Urdal, 2002:244). The number of causalities in the 
whole Bosnian War was 102,000 (Tabeau og Bijak, 2005:206).  
Both the massacres in Bosnia and Darfur can be considered very serious. The size of 
the abuses alone is not sufficient to explain the different American attitudes and practice 
towards its genocides. The different international settings have also to be taken into 
consideration.  
4.2 The international setting 
In this section, I will address the international settings in 1995 and 2004 in order to see 
whether this influenced the American attitudes and responses towards Bosnia and Darfur. 
4.2.1 International setting at the time of the Bosnian conflict 
The Bosnian conflict was considered to be a European problem (Power, 2002), and the United 
States intervened only after Europe failed in addressing the conflict. European policy makers 
had already in early 1991 claimed that they had authority, strength, and the will to manage the 
collapse of Yugoslavia (Power, 2002:258). In order to let Europe show their ability to act as a 
unified power, the United States therefore stepped aside. The United States stayed with its 
defensive plan until the Bosnian crisis intensified, and Srebrenica fell in July 1995. The 
American political elite debated concrete action to help innocent civilians, but it chose to stay 
passive behind Europe until Srebrenica fell. 
 Already prior to 1995, both the Secretary of State, and the President showed low 
interests in Bosnia. Repeatedly throughout the war, Secretary of State James Baker announced 
that the United States “did not have a dog in the fight”. President Bush neither paid much 
attention to the conflict in Bosnia. He often asked National Security Advisor Scowfort about, 
“Now, tell me again what this is all about?” (Power 2002:286). The low interests in Bosnia 
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continued throughout the 104th Congress. In July 1995, Senator Reid (CR12, 1995: S9980) 
argued that it was time for the United States to “step back, and let other countries do their 
share for a change...we have done Somalia; we have done Haiti. Have we not done enough?” 
As late as mid-July 1995, President Clinton (PP13, 1995b:1089) claimed that it was not in the 
American interests to step up its involvements in Bosnia.  
 There was a split in the American political elite on whether Bosnia was only a European 
problem. There was a political split on whether the United States should stick to its defensive 
policy, or adapt a more offensive oriented approach on Bosnia. Additionally, there was a split 
with regards to whether Bosnia was considered only a European problem. Power (2002:287) 
argues that the officials within the State Department who cared about America’s Bosnia 
policy could be divided into three groups. First, there were those who favoured an American 
intervention, secondly, senior policymakers who opposed it, and lastly the officials who 
supported bombing but assumed it would not happen. While both President Bush and 
President Clinton opposed an intervention because Bosnia was considered a European 
problem, there were those who argued in favour of the opposite; that Bosnia was an American 
interest. In a Congressional Hearing before the Commission on Security and Cooperation in 
Europe, Christopher Smith (CH14, 1995a:11) stated that, “this is not just Europe’s problem”. 
A major challenge for Europe in stopping the conflict was the increased number of refugees 
as the war escalated. The concern for innocent civilians should be considered more as an 
international problem, than only a European problem. In a House Hearing, before the 
Committee on International Relations on the American policy in Europe in July 1995, 
Holbrooke (CH, 1995d:46) claimed that, “the United States will be an active participant in 
Europe for a simple reason- our self- interests require it”. His argumentation was based on a 
fact that history proves that when the United States disengage from Europe, the European 
instability that follows draws the United States back in. On this background, Holbrooke (CH, 
1995d:2) stated that the United States should commit itself to an engaged and active foreign 
policy throughout Europe. 
 Representative Frank Wolf claimed that Congress tended to be too focused on economic 
                                                
12 For this thesis, I use CR as an abbreviation for Congressional Record. All Congressional Records are cited 
with the following information in the bibliography: Author. Title, TYPE OF MEDIUM. Date of publication. 
Supplier. Available: Uniform Resource Locator . [Access date] 
13 For this thesis, I use PP as an abbreviation for Public Papers of the President of the United States. All Public 
Papers are cited with the following information in the bibliography: Author. Title, TYPE OF MEDIUM. Date of 
publication. Supplier. Available: Uniform Resource Locator . [Access date]. 
14 For this thesis, I use CH as an abbreviation for Congressional Hearing. All Congressional Hearings are cited 
with the following information in the bibliography: Author. Title, TYPE OF MEDIUM. Date of publication. 
Supplier. Available: Uniform Resource Locator . [Access date]. 
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issues, and less on moral and human right issues. In a Congressional Hearing before the 
Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe in April 1995, Wolf (CH, 1995b:4) 
stated that, “It is hard to get Congress members to focus on human right issues”. In the 
aftermath of the fall of Srebrenica, Christopher Smith talked to the House of Representatives 
about national interests. He (CR, 1995: E1620) stated that 27 NGOs had together come up 
with an agreement that, “Bosnia is not a faraway land of no concern to our `national interest.' 
At stake is the global commitment to fundamental human values, the right not to be killed 
because of one's religious or ethnic heritage, and the right of civilians not to be targeted by 
combatants”. Smith called for increased efforts in order to stop the crisis in Bosnia. 
 While the Clinton administration that took over in 1993 tended to consider the conflict a 
European problem, there was pressure from voices in Congress for a more active and engaged 
policy towards Bosnia. In the aftermath of the fall of Srebrenica, the administration became 
more offensively oriented. The United States changed focus from being moral oriented in 
sense of helping innocent civilians, to become more concerned about the actual crimes being 
committed by Serbs against civilians. While the American political elite had debated concrete 
action during the whole Bosnian War, it was first after Srebrenica’s fall that the United States 
adapted a more offensive policy towards Bosnia. In 1995, as Europe had failed, the United 
States and NATO intervened, with the Operation Deliberate Force. The American lead 
intervention can be considered a tool to strengthen the NATO’s position and its credibility to 
ensure peace and stability. While NATO was established in 1949 as a collective defence 
system to ensure peace and security, it failed to live up to those promises as the Bosnian war 
escalated. During the Bosnian War, NATO transformed from being a collective defence 
system to become a collective security organization. It went from providing defence to 
provide international stability, which originally was the role of the UN. The NATO was in 
other words taking over the role of the UN. NATO, just like the United States, stepped aside 
in order to let Europe solve the conflict. In 1995, as Europe had failed, the United States and 
NATO intervened.  
4.2.2  International setting at the time of the crisis in Darfur 
In 2004, as the GOS failed to fulfil the responsibility of protecting its own people, the United 
States, and the international community saw it necessarily to increase its involvement in the 
crisis. The Congress more frequently addressed the conflict, but the United States did not 
intervene. Such a response can be explained in different ways; the United States was already 
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involved in Afghanistan and Iraq, the genocide in Darfur was only one element of the 
Sudanese conflict, and there were other great powers involved in Sudan. Instead of 
intervening, the United States tried to have other actors to intervene. This was based on the 
fact that an American or NATO lead intervention would result in negative reactions from 
regional leaders in Africa or the Middle East who tended to favour the principle of state 
sovereignty and non-intervention. Sudan is important for both the African and Arabic World, 
which challenged the legitimacy of an American lead intervention. A reliance on the UN can 
therefore be considered as a tool to legitimize the operations. While the United States can be 
accused for colonial or imperialistic politics, The UN cannot be accused for colonialism or 
imperialism. The ability of the United States to intervene was challenged from local actors, 
which will further be addressed in a later section. Now, I will look at other reasons for why 
the United States alone did not intervene in Darfur.  
 First of all, the United States was already involved in Iraq and Afghanistan, and could 
not afford or risk to get involved in a third war. This can explain why the United States 
adapted a more verbal than physical oriented approach regarding an intervention in Darfur. 
Second, the conflict in Sudan was complex, which meant that the genocide in Darfur was only 
one element of the conflict. Already in 1955, there broke out a civil war between the Northern 
Sudan, predominately Arabs and Muslims and the Southern Sudan that was mainly Christian. 
As the war intensified, the international community got involved in peace negotiations. 
Huliaras (2006:709) argues that,”for many years, external mediator including Nigeria, Kenya, 
Ethiopia, and former U.S. president Jimmy Carter had tried unsuccessfully to persuade the 
Sudanese government and southern rebels (SPLA/M) to cease the fighting”. In 1995, the 
United States succeeded in negotiating the longest ceasefire in the war, which lasted for 
almost six months. Peace negotiations intensified in 2003 and the early 2004, and finally in 
January 2005, both sides singed the Comprehensive Peace Agreement.  
 The United States mainly supported the Southern side, and the Christians. Jodi Eichler-
Levine and Rosemary R. Hicks (2007:715) claim that, “evangelical Christians were active in 
Sudan prior to the Darfur crisis. During the 1990s, they lobbied for American intervention 
after reports that Christians in Southern Sudan faced attacks from roving Arabs”. In according 
to Huliaras (2006:712) evangelists comprise an important part of the Republican voter base. 
For decades, evangelical groups had mainly been focused on domestic issues, but in recent 
years the evangelical political agenda has shifted to foreign affairs, and as the conflict in 
Sudan intensified, “evangelical groups also started to show a strong interest in U.S. foreign 
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policy toward Africa’s largest country” (Huliaras, 2006:712). Huliaras, (2006:717) states, “the 
evangelical community played a critical role in placing Sudan on the U.S. government 
agenda”. In a Senate Hearing before the Committee on Foreign Relations, the Special Advisor 
to the President, John Prendergast argued that, “Sudan has been at the top of the Bush 
Administration’s radar screen since it came to office” (CH, 2004b:49). In the same hearing, 
the assisting Secretary of State for African Affairs, Charles Snyder (CH, 2004b:9), claimed, 
“the administration considers resolving the situation in Darfur to be one of its highest 
priorities”. The United States adapted an offensively oriented approach towards Darfur by 
condemning the crimes that were being committed, declaring it as genocide, increasing its 
economic spending on humanitarian assistance and peacekeeping missions, in addition to 
called upon the UN to act in similar ways. The United States’ policy was “do not do anything 
through the government of Khartoum. Don’t give them money, “We have two sets of partners 
primarily. One is the U.N. and other international agencies and the others are NGOs, 
nongovernmental organizations” (CH, 2004b:39). It was most important to have the 
Government of Sudan to stop the atrocities against its own people. Before the Government 
could cooperate with the United States on economic issues, it was necessarily to be able to 
protect its own people.  
 Another reason for the increased American involvement in Darfur and Sudan can be 
connected to the war on terror. Sudan had become a safe haven for international terrorists 
groups, certainly a reason to trigger an American involvement in the region. In order to sum 
up, the conflict in Sudan was complex, and regional factors such as the civil war, the war on 
terrorism and peace negotiations might have limited the focus on the genocide in Darfur. The 
genocide in Darfur, emerging just as the civil war in the Southern Sudan ended, was only one 
puzzle of the whole conflict.  
 Besides the United States, there were also other states present in Sudan at the time of 
the Darfur crisis. Kjølberg (2006:21) claims that the three great powers of the United States, 
China and Russia all had national interests, which they refused to risk in Sudan. While the 
United States addressed Sudan and Darfur in terms of condemning the crimes and declaring it 
as genocide, it additionally worked with Sudan in order to combat international terrorism 
(Kjølberg, 2006:21). The Russian interests were mainly concerned with weapon sales. 
Besides Russia, China was also involved in weapon sales to Sudan, but its interests were 
mainly based in oil. Human Rights Watch15 states that the Chinese involvement in Sudan and 
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Darfur can be explained in, “a need for oil reserves for its growing domestic economy caused 
its government to pursue investments in many countries of marginal stability and democracy”. 
80% of Sudan’s oil export goes to China (Kjølberg, 2006:17). In addition to oil import, 
Human Rights Watch stated that since 1996, China has supplied Sudan with arms. It has been 
claimed that China sold weapons and received oil in exchange16, which was a violation of the 
UN embargo. A report by Human Right First claims, “90% of the light weapons bought by 
Sudan, and used also in the war in Darfur, were sold by China17. At the same time, it is 
important to mention that this percentage number of weapon sale to Sudan is debated. While 
Human Right First claims that China is the main supplier, another report by the Stockholm 
International Peace Research Institute states that in the period of 2003–2007, Sudan received 
87 per cent of its major conventional weapons from Russia and 8 per cent from China (SIPRI, 
2008:4). In addition to the three great powers, also Europe had interest in the Darfur crisis 
(Kjølberg, 2006:21). Also European states accused and condemned GOS for the crimes being 
committed towards innocent civilians. While the focus for this research project is on the 
American practice towards Darfur, it is important to keep in mind that also other states had 
interests in Sudan in 2004.  
4.2.3 A comparison of the international settings at times of 
Bosnia and Darfur 
A comparison of the international settings in 1995 and 2004 will be done in terms of two 
factors; did the local actors want an intervention, and were there American resources 
available. First of all, with regards to Bosnia, local actors were in favor of an intervention and 
there were resources available. The Bosnian war had challenged the credibility to NATO, and 
an intervention can therefore be considered as a tool to strengthen its position and credibility. 
Europe had failed to stop the crisis, and the United States and NATO intervened in 1995. 
The scenario was different towards Darfur. In 2004, local actors were not favoring an 
intervention and there were not resources available. The GOS was favoring the principle of 
state sovereignty and non-intervention, claiming that an intervention was colonialism or new-
imperialism. African and Arabic states supported GOS in such view. An intervention would 
therefore have resulted in negative reactions in the region. In addition, the United States was 
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already involved in Afghanistan and Iraq, and did not want to get involved in another conflict. 
There were also other great powers that were present in Darfur in 2004. China, Russia and 
other European states were also present. The United States stayed multilateral engaged by 
calling upon the UN to increase its action. This can be set in connection with the American 
interests. A multilateral oriented United States is more likely to gain respect in the world than 
a unilateral actor only concerning about its own interests. According to Mazarr 
(2003:519),”the United States is stronger when it acts in alliances and under the United 
Nations banner”.  
 Besides a need to maintain its national interests, a multilateral orientation by the United 
States in 2004 can also mean it was more aware of the presence and importance of 
international law on genocide at the time of Darfur. It might have been in the American 
interests to address and prevent genocide. I will study such argument in the next section, but 
for now I conclude that the international setting cannot directly and alone explain the 
American attitudes and response towards genocide. While the United States considered 
Bosnia as a European problem, it considered Darfur as an international problem. The United 
States was in other words not considering any of the conflicts to be its own national problem. 
The American involvement should therefore be explained in other factors than just the 
international setting. I will later also study some intervening variables, but first, ideational 
explanations should be addressed.  
 
4.3 Ideational explanations 
I will now move on to address the ideational explanations, in terms of the presence and 
importance of international law at the times of the conflicts in Bosnia and Darfur.  
4.3.1 The presence and importance of international law and 
norms at the time of Bosnia  
Power (2002:288) claims that in the first years of the conflict, the Bush administration 
avoided to use the term genocide because a genocide finding would create a moral imperative. 
Instead of applying the term genocide, President Bush preferred the phrase “ethnic cleansing”. 
Power (2002:292) argues that the closest the Bush administration came to acknowledging 
genocide was on December 18, 1992, when the United States joined a UN General assembly 
38 
 
resolution holding Serbian and Montenegrin forces responsible for aggression, and for “the 
abhorrent policy of ethnic cleaning, which is a form of genocide” (A/47/121, 1992). As the 
Bosnian crisis intensified during 1995, Congress more frequently addressed whether Bosnia 
was genocide. An implementing of the term genocide on Bosnia would mean that the United 
States was expected to undertake action thereafter. 
 There had already prior to the 104th Congress been some discussions on whether the 
crime committed in Bosnia was genocide. In June of 1993, Representative McCloskey (CR, 
1993:H4263) claimed “the Bosnian Moslem people are being decimated by a systematic 
genocide run by the Belgrade regime of Slobodan Milosevic”. In the same Congressional 
debate, Representative Bonior (CR, 1993:H4262) agreed, and stated that there should be let 
no doubt “that what is happening to the Moslems in Bosnia is genocide. Ethnic cleaning is 
genocide”. A year later, in April 1994, Representative John Olver (CR, 1994: H2634) 
announced that “we have called it ethnic cleansing, but perhaps that is a prettier word for 
what it is- genocide”. 
  While Congress in 1995 debated whether Bosnia was genocide, the focus for the 
Clinton administration was not on whether the term genocide should be taken in use. The term 
genocide is not mentioned in any of the ten studied Public Papers of the Presidents from 1995 
on “Srebrenica”. The focus in all these ten papers is Clinton’s response to whether the arms 
embargo should be lifted in order to stop the crisis, and not on whether the crimes committed 
were genocide. Such finding reflects that the Clinton administration was more focused on real 
political challenges than the ideational link between action and crime that became more 
relevant at the times of Darfur. While there are no findings of the term genocide in any of the 
Public Papers of the President from 1995, the term is more frequently used in Congressional 
hearings, and it even more frequently appears in the Congressional records of the 104th 
Congress. This could implicate that the administration was more aware of the responsibilities 
and obligations that followed a genocide definition than Congress.  
 At the time of the Bosnian War, the White House never issued a directive calling for 
research, or analysis to determine whether a genocide case should be made against Milosevic 
or Yugoslavia (Power, 2002:290). During 1995, there were some independent investigations, 
but these were not ordered from the White House. On background of an investigation, CIA 
Deputy Director for Intelligence John Gannon in early August 1995 stated that that it was 
mainly the Bosnian Serbs who had been committing the crimes in Bosnia. In addition to the 
investigation conducted by CIA, the world’s largest rape investigation was conducted in 
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Bosnia. In a Congressional Hearing on genocide in Bosnia-Herzegovina before the 
Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe in April 1995, law professor Bassiouni 
testimony about this rape investigation. Bassiouni was among those who had examined over 
1600 cases of rape, identified mass graves, and visited areas in Bosnia from 1992-1994. 
Bassiouni (CH, 1995b:7) claimed that on background of their findings, ethnic cleansing was 
taking place. In Congressional debates, there sometimes tended to be a blurry distinction of 
the two terms ethnic cleansing and genocide. Representative Bonior (CR, 1995:H4262) even 
argued that, ” Ethnic cleaning is genocide”. A factor important to keep in mind is that the 
members of Congress are politicians, and not analysts. This could simply clarify the blurry 
use of the terms ethnic cleansing and genocide. While members of Congress tended to blurry 
the two terms, there were others who tried to stress the importance to distinct between the two 
terms. 
 Professor Bassiouni tried to create awareness of the importance of keeping the two 
terms of ethnic cleansing and genocide separate. An implementation of genocide would lead 
to certain responsibilities and obligations under international law. Bassiouni (CH, 1995b:12) 
claimed that, “the question of genocide is a little more complicated because of the way the 
Convention is drafted in terms of a specific intent”. He (CH, 1995b:12) further argued that 
whether Bosnia is genocide would depend on the contexts of the study. “If you took, for 
example, the context of Prijedor, where 56,000 Bosnians are missing and a large number of 
them were killed...then you can find an intent to eliminate in whole or in part a particular 
group within that context. If you take the broader interpretation of genocide as involving the 
entire group of the nation, then, of course, you cannot reach the same conclusion”. In other 
words, while a narrow focus could justify calling Bosnia genocide, a broader context would 
not allow a determination of Bosnia as genocide. Senator Thurmond was among those who 
were aware of the seriousness of calling Bosnia genocide. Instead of explicitly using the term 
genocide, Thurmond (CR, 1995:S10177) drew a parallel between the crimes in Srebrenica, 
and the Second World War. 
 There are obligations connected with a genocide definition, and it was the Genocide 
Convention that shaped expectations about obligations in 1995. Article 1 of the Genocide 
Convention states that genocide is a crime under international law that Contracting parties 
undertake to prevent and punish. An implementing of the term genocide would mean that the 
United States was expected to undertake action in Bosnia. R2P was not present at the time of 
Bosnia in 1995. In Congress, Smith (CR, 1995:E1620) reminded the United States that the 
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international community has a moral and legal duty to prevent genocide through the Genocide 
Prevention. In a Congressional Hearing for the Commission on Security and Cooperation in 
Europe, Christopher Smith (CH, 1995a:2) stated that, “the world’s commitment to the human 
rights is questioned when our collective consciences are unaffected by the horrors that is 
reported from Bosnia-Herzegovina”. In the same hearing, Bosnian Prime Minister Silajdzic 
(CH, 1995a:6) reminded the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe that, “no 
country can escape the unilateral responsibility to oppose genocide and aggression”. He stated 
that Bosnia was genocide, and read article 2 of the Genocide Convention to remind everyone 
about what genocide is. Chairman Smith (CH, 1995a:9) agreed, and expressed that, “this 
absolutely is genocide”. Besides this, the Genocide Prevention was not too frequently 
mentioned during the 104th Congress. This can be set in connection with the refusal to define 
Bosnia and Srebrenica as genocide. The obligations under the Genocide Convention will only 
apply when a genocide definition occurs. 
Among the American political elite, there was during 1995 a debate on whether 
Bosnia should be defined as genocide or not, but it is important to stress that the main part of 
the debate was on whether the arms embargo should be lifted or not. The main focus was on 
concrete action in order to help innocent civilians. It was in other words not the importance of 
having Bosnia defined as genocide that was most relevant in the American political debate in 
1995, but more the real political challenges.  
4.3.2 The presence and importance of international law and 
norms at the time of Darfur 
Darfur became the first time that an on-going crisis was defined as genocide, but for some of 
the American political elite it was not enough to have Darfur defined as genocide. Following 
the American decision to define Darfur as genocide on September 9, 2004, there developed an 
increased focus on obligations and responsibilities that follow a genocide definition. For 
many within the United States, words were not enough, and a call for concrete action 
developed. The fact that the political elite applied the genocide definition on Darfur, and at 
the same time was aware of the responsibilities that followed such action proves that 
politicians relied on international law towards Darfur. The government of the United States 
was at the time of the Darfur crisis aware of the connection between crime and action, but 
such awareness can also be explained as an element of idealism in the Bush administration’s 
politics, and therefore not as a concern about international law. I will discuss this later. 
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As the crisis in Darfur intensified, members of Congress called upon the Bush 
administration to take stand in order to define the conflict in Darfur. In the beginning of July, 
Representative Frank Wolf (CR, 2004: D723) sensed that Powell should make a 
determination as to whether the situation in Darfur was genocide. Two weeks later, in mid- 
July, Wolf took the floor again. He had just returned from a trip to Sudan, and stressed the 
importance of defining Darfur as genocide, in addition to take action thereafter (CR, 
2004:H5918). Besides speaking, Wolf was eager to have articles and statements recorded. 
This was of importance so when historians later would look back at Darfur, they would see 
evidences that the world knew. At the time of Darfur, there had not been a lack of 
information, but rather a lack of willingness to act. (CR, Wolf, 2004:E1071). Frank Wolf was 
among those who most frequently took the floor in order to address the situation in Darfur. 
Wolf (CR, 2004:S7506) often stated that, “I am going to keep mentioning this issue on the 
floor at every opportunity because we have a chance to reverse the travesty”. A study of 
documents from the 108th Congress shows that representatives Wolf accomplished with Lee, 
Kennedy, Feingold, Prendergast and Cummings took the floor repeatedly in order to put focus 
on the situation in Darfur. Their aim was to "focus on Darfur and not have it fall of the radar 
screen” (Senator Corzine, CR, 2004:S4946).  
Barbara Lee was among those who stressed the importance of defining Darfur as 
genocide. Barbara Lee (CR, 2004:E894) argued that, “the crimes in Darfur were beyond 
ethnic cleansing. It is genocide!” Lee called on the Bush administration to call the crime 
genocide because “we must stop genocide now”. Kennedy belonged to the other camp. In 
Congress in the end of April 2004, Senator Kennedy debated whether Darfur was genocide, 
but instead of taking a clear stand like Lee, Kennedy (CR, 2004:S4678) argued that regardless 
of whether Darfur was genocide or not, action should be taken. Senator Feingold (CH, 
2004b:3) argued on the same page by saying that, “there seems to be some disagreement 
about whether what is happening in Darfur is or is not genocide. Frankly, I believe that to 
argue over the semantics is to miss the point. What is happening is appalling...and we cannot 
stand by and simply watch this...” The label of genocide was debated, and the American 
political elite was aware of responsibilities that would follow a genocide definition. Tancredo 
argued (CR, 2004: H5534) that, “the word matter”. In a Senate Hearing before the Committee 
on Foreign Relations, Brownback (CH, 2004c:42) followed up Tancredo’s argument by 
saying “the words are important. And this word, the word on genocide, is very important and 
will have ramifications...around the world and in the government in Khartoum”. Already in 
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late April, Feingold (CH, 2004b:3) had claimed that, “we ratified the Genocide Convention 
because doing so was an act that affirmed our commitment to basic human decency and 
affirmed our understanding of our own obligations to act to prevent genocide from 
occurring”. John Prendergast (CH, 2004b:49) argued that the situation in Darfur more than 
satisfied the Genocide Convention’s conditions for multilateral preventive action, and “even if 
argument continues about whether this is a case of actual or potential genocide, it cannot be 
contested that in Darfur a large section of Sudan’s population is alarmingly at risk, that the 
Government of Sudan has so far failed comprehensively in its responsibility to protect them, 
and that it is time for the international community, through the Security Council, to assume 
that responsibility”. As the crisis intensified throughout 2004, Senator Cummings (CR, 
2004:H3002) stated that, “it is moving closer and closer being described as genocide”. There 
was awareness of how strong the label of genocide was, but words were not enough. Concrete 
action was also needed. Senator Barbara Boxer (CH, 2004c:56) stated that, “I do think words 
matter. And I also think actions, of course, matter more”.  
 While members of Congress more frequently applied the label genocide on Darfur, the 
administration refused to do the same before necessary research and investigation had been 
conducted. In records and hearings from the 108th Congress, there tend to be a much more 
frequent use of the word genocide than in the official released documents of the American 
Presidency and the State Department and Defence Department. The Bush administration 
reflected the argumentation of those who were more careful in implementing genocide on 
Darfur. On June 30 2004, Colin Powell claimed, “we see indicators and elements that would 
start to move you toward a genocide conclusion, but we are not there yet”. The United States 
still relied on the statement of John Negroponte from the end of April where he in a Senate 
Hearing before the Committee on Foreign Relations, had stated that we believe what has 
occurred in Darfur is ethnic cleansing (CH, 2004a:55). The Bush administration’s move from 
characterizing Darfur as ethnic cleaning to define it as genocide occurred in the aftermath of 
investigations that were conducted in the summer of 2004. Investigation was conducted in 
order for the Bush administration to be completely sure genocide occurred before they 
officially could define Darfur as genocide. In a Senate Hearing before the Committee on 
Foreign Relations, the Assistant Administrator for Democracy, Conflict, Humanitarian 
Assistance, US agency for International Development, Roger Winter (CH, 2004b:14) stated 
that the United States followed the situation in Darfur closely by, “an incident log in which 
we record attacks against civilians. We are keeping a record of them as they are reported to 
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us, and they continue up through now, and some aerial attacks periodically also continue”. In 
addition, senior U.S officials visited Darfur to call attention to the conflict, and to have the 
Government of Sudan to stop the atrocities. The most important investigation of the situation 
in Darfur was ordered by the Bush administration in the summer of 2004. In July 2004, the 
United States sent a team to conduct interviews with Sudanese refugees (Totten, 2009:205). 
An Atrocities Documentation Team, assembled at the initiative of the U.S Department of 
State’s Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor (DRL) conducted semi-structured 
interviews of 1136 randomly selected Sudanese refugees in 19 locations in eastern Chad in 
the period from July 12 to August 18, 2004 (CH, Powell, 2004c:9). On background of the 
report that followed the Atrocities Documentation Team’s interviews of Sudanese refugees, 
the Bush administration declared genocide in Darfur on September 9, 2004. 
 In the aftermath of the official American declaration of Darfur as genocide on 
September 9, 2004, Senator Jon S. Corzine (CH, 2004c:28) stressed that “now we have 
obligations under the Genocide Treaty that must be addressed”. Corzine (CH, 2004c:25) 
further claimed, “I think words, while they are not the important issue, they do have real 
implications with regard to moving the international community, and I think it gives us 
greater leverage in negotiating these U.N. resolutions...” President Bush was not afraid of 
apply the term genocide after the decision to define Darfur as genocide was taken. In late 
September, Bush (PP, 2004c:2144) stated “the world is witnessing terrible suffering and 
horrible crimes in the Darfur region of Sudan, crimes my Government has concluded are 
genocide”. 
 In order to understand American foreign politics, the relationship between realism and 
idealism has to be addressed. Jervis (2003:365) argues that post-9/11, the Bush administration 
adapted a policy reflecting a willingness to act unilaterally when necessary, which does not fit 
with my argumentation of the United States as multilateral oriented towards Darfur. At the 
same time, a reliance on international law in sense of working through the UN in addressing 
the crisis in Darfur could reflect that the United States was not considering it obligatory to act 
unilaterally. The GOS could accuse the United States, but not the UN, for applying a colonial 
oriented policy. A reliance on the UN can therefore be considered a tool to legitimize the 
operations, or additionally, it could simply be considered as an element of American idealism. 
A balance between realism and idealism shapes the American foreign policy. Mazarr 
(2003:503) claims, “President Bush and his foreign policy team embraced realism as their 
guiding philosophy, but Bush’s officials are adherents of the distinctly liberal and idealist 
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notion of the ‘democratic peace’”. He (2003:513) further argues that President Bush and his 
senior officials characterized the threat of terrorism in ideological, rather than material terms. 
I have already stated that Sudan, serving as a safe haven for terrorists groups, was important 
for the United States in its war on terror. To sum up, there was in 2004 an awareness of the 
presence and importance on international law, but such awareness can also be explained as an 
element of idealism. The actual American response towards Darfur was verbal, and not 
physical.  
4.3.3 A comparison of international law at the times of Bosnia 
and Darfur 
While the political elite was more concerned about implementing the term, and stressing the 
importance of having Darfur defined as genocide, this was of less importance to Bosnia. 
While the focus was on concrete action towards Bosnia, the focus at the time of the Darfur 
crisis was more on the connection between crime and action. Within the American political 
elite, it was important to have Darfur defined as genocide because a use of the term genocide 
would lead to certain obligations and responsibilities for the United States to take action in 
order to stop the crisis. While the United States officially defined Darfur as genocide on 
September 9, 2004, Srebrenica was not defined as genocide before ten years after in 2005.  
While the Genocide Convention was present at both the times of the crisis in Bosnia and 
Darfur, R2P was only present at the time of Darfur in 2004. I have earlier stated that while 
R2P was first consolidated as an international norm in 2005, its origin goes back to a report 
from 2001. This justifies my argument of R2P as relevant at the time of Darfur. 
  In the United States, there were more concerns about the international law and norms 
on genocide at the time of Darfur compared to Bosnia. In addition, the American political 
process towards Darfur was relatively fast moving in the sense that there was a fast progress 
from debates started to actual action was taken. It was first debated whether the crimes should 
be condemned. Action was then taken as both Senate and the House of Representatives 
condemned the crimes, and President Bush followed up by doing the same. The path from 
debate to action was also fast with regards to the decision to declare Darfur as genocide. 
Additionally, economic resolutions were passed to increase spending on humanitarian 
assistance and peacekeeping missions. In the summer of 2004, between the decisions to 
condemn the crimes in the spring of 2004 and to declare Darfur as genocide in September 
2004, the political debate in the United States turned into having more of an economical 
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focus. In Congress, voices called for increased spending on humanitarian assistance and the 
African Union’s peacekeeping mission. The aim was to see concrete action being taken, and 
members of Congress called upon the administration for increased American action in order 
to stop the crisis in Darfur.  
 Even thought, there was debated whether Darfur was of national interests, resolutions 
were passed, which proves that there was a certain willingness to act. The resolutions, 
S.CON.RES 99 and H.CON.RES 403; to condemn the crimes, and S.CON.RES 133 and 
H.CON.RES 467; to declare Darfur as genocide show that there was within the American 
Congress, a political willingness to act. The fact that the Bush administration condemned the 
crimes, and declared Darfur as genocide prove that it was not just members of Congress, but 
also the American Presidency and State officials who indicated a willingness to act. The 
economic debate of the 108th Congress on Darfur that developed in the aftermath of the 
decision to declare Darfur genocide was mainly on H.R 4613, Department of Defense 
Appropriations Act, 2005, and H.R. 4818, Consolidated Appropriations Act. While President 
Bush signed the first on August 5, 2004, the latter was signed into law on December 8, 2004. 
In common, both H.R 4613, and H.R 4818, aimed to provide humanitarian assistance to the 
crisis in Sudan. The fast progress between debate and action connects to the fact that Darfur 
was declared as genocide. A use of the label genocide leads to certain expectations about 
responsibility and action. At the time of Darfur in 2004, the United States was aware of the 
connection between crime and action since the Congressional debate in 2004 to a higher 
extend addressed the term genocide, and the connection between crime and action. There was 
from 1995 to 2004 a shift in the importance and reliance on international law and norms on 
genocide. Such a finding could implement that the American attitudes towards genocide are 
more ideational than structural oriented, but it is important to keep in mind that the American 
foreign policy is shaped in a balance between realism and idealism. The increased reliance on 
international law can therefore be considered as an element of idealism in the politics of the 
Bush administration.  
Ideational or structural explanations cannot alone explain the American response 
towards Bosnia and Darfur. A few other explanations, which might have contributed to 
influence the structural and ideational explanations in shaping the American attitudes, should 
therefore be addressed. In will now address the intervening variables of lobbying, the role of 
media and local actors in 1995 and 2004. 
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4.4 Intervening explanations 
This section provides a study of three intervening variables that might have influenced the 
American attitudes and responses towards Bosnia and Darfur. First, lobbying is presented, 
before the role of media and local politics will be studied.  
4.4.1 Lobbying 
Lobbying is the attempts to influence decisions, and this section provides a presentation of the 
American lobbying that took place in 1995 and 2004. 
American lobbying on Bosnia 
So far, my discussion has showed that the Congressional debate on the Bosnian crisis 
concerned on what action to take in order to stop the crisis. Within Congress, it was mainly 
debated whether the arms embargo should be lifted or not. I have concluded that lobbying is 
the attempts to influence decisions. The representatives who repeatedly stood up to speak in 
Congress about Bosnia should therefore not be characterized as lobbying actors, but more as 
someone who worked hard to influence the decisions on whether or not to intervene in 
Bosnia. The camp that argued for a more offensive oriented policy increased their work for an 
intervention as the conflict intensified, and Srebrenica fell in 1995. With that kept in mind, I 
now move on to addressing the lobbying actors; the NGOs and grass root organizations that 
attempted to influence the American political elite to intervene in Bosnia.  
Besides the members of Congress who worked intense in order to influence, and 
trigger in favour of an American intervention, there were American NGOs and other 
organizations that also addressed the Bosnian crisis. Their aim was to pressure the political 
elite to increase its action in order to stop the crisis. Power (2002:435) states that as the crisis 
in Bosnia intensified a number of human rights groups overcame their opposition to use force 
and called for military intervention in order to stop the crimes. While President Clinton and 
most members of Congress were trying to keep American troops out of Bosnia, a coalition of 
human rights, religious and medical groups called for stepped-up U.S. and foreign military 
action to end the slaughter of Muslim civilians (Priest, 1995:1) In July of 1995, a coalition of 
thirty-seven organizations issued a press release that demanded military intervention (Power, 
2002:435). A common statement claimed, “Force must be used to stop genocide…American 
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leadership, in particular, is needed…Nothing else has worked”. Among the signatories were 
the American Jewish Community, the American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee, World 
Vision, Refugees International and Human Rights Watch (Power, 2002:435). It was a huge 
deal for some of the organizations that never before had argued for military force. Farkas 
(2003:210) states that, “the Bosnian lobby was based on humanitarian concern, not ethnic 
affiliation or geostrategic calculations”, which reflects the view of the American political elite 
that was also concerned about protecting the innocent civilians. While the political elite was 
spilt on whether to intervene in Bosnia, its main concern was humanitarian in terms of 
protecting the civilians. In addition to lobbying, media also played a role in adapting a pro-
intervention approach. The role of media will be addressed later. 
American lobbying on Darfur  
As the previous section stated, there were some representatives who repeatedly took 
the floor in Congress to call for an American intervention in Bosnia. The same was scenario 
in 2004, when some representatives stood up in the 108th Congress to call for increased action 
in order to stop the Darfur crisis. A study of documents from the 108th Congress shows that 
representatives Wolf, Lee, Kennedy, Feingold, Prendergast and Cummings took the floor 
repeatedly throughout the 108th Congress in order to put focus on the situation in Darfur. 
Their aim was to "focus on Darfur and not have it fall of the radar screen” (Senator Corzine, 
CR, 2004:S4946). Wolf (CR, 2004:S7506) often stated that, “I am going to keep mentioning 
this issue on the floor at every opportunity because we have a chance to reverse the travesty”. 
In the previous section, it was also stated that the representatives who repeatedly took the 
floor in Congress should not be considered as lobbying actors, but rather as actors who aimed 
to influence the American decisions. This also applied to Darfur. I will therefore move on to 
address the NGOs and grass root organizations that lobbied for an American intervention in 
order to stop the crisis in 1995.   
The American interest in Darfur is connected to its involvement in the Sudanese 
conflict. I have already, in the section addressing the international setting in 2004, presented 
the complexity of the Sudanese conflict, and how the genocide in Darfur was only one 
element of it. Sudan was in the American interests because of its role in the war on terror, its 
oil industry, and due to the presence of other great powers in the region. An additional factor 
is the religious connection between South Sudan and the Bush administration. During the civil 
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war, the United States supported the Southern Sudan, which were mainly Christians. 
Religious groups in the United States lobbied their case. In the United States, President Bush 
had support from Evangelicals voters, which can help explain their ability to influence his 
politics. There is often made parallels between the faith of President Bush and its implications 
for the policy (Mazarr, 2003:508). Evangelical Christians put Sudan on the agenda, but as the 
crisis intensified” celebrities, ordinary citizens turned activists, and college campuses around 
the United States mobilized behind action on Darfur” (Sidahmed, Soderlund and Briggs, 
2010:65). 
The most well known organization to address the crisis in Darfur is Save Darfur. Save 
Darfur is an alliance of over 100 faith-based, humanitarian and human rights organizations, 
which aims to “unite our voices to raise public awareness and mobilize a massive response to 
the atrocities in Sudan's western region of Darfur” 18. Save Darfur was founded in 2004, and 
has since then called on the United States, other governments and the UN to end the crisis. In 
addition to Save Darfur, there are a numerous of other NGOs, which also aim to influence the 
international community to increase its action. While many NGOs, such as Save Darfur put 
individual cases on the radar screen, there are some organizations with a broader focus. One 
example is the International Coalition for Responsibility to Protect (ICRtoP), which was 
created in January 2009, to “strengthen the normative consensus for R2P, further the 
understanding of the norm, push for strengthened capacities to prevent and halt genocide, war 
crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. It further aims to mobilize NGOs to 
push for action to save lives in R2P country-specific situation”19. During 2004, there was 
intense lobbying from groups that lobbied for an increased American involvement.  
A comparison of American lobbying on Bosnia and Darfur  
At both the times of the conflicts in Bosnia and Darfur, there was American lobbying for 
increased action. It has been pointed out that some representatives of Congress repeatedly 
took the floor in order to call for increased American involvement. While these 
representatives were active in trying to influence the American response towards Bosnia and 
Darfur, their role should not be characterized as lobbying. For this thesis, lobbying actors 
have been the NGOs and other organizations that worked to pressure the American political 
elite to take action. 
                                                
18 Save Darfur’s unity statement can be found at: http://www.savedarfur.org/pages/unity_statement 
19 ICRtoP’s unity statement can be found at: http://www.responsibilitytoprotect.org/index.php/about-coalition 
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 Lobbying in 1995 differed from 2004 in the sense that it was more one-way sided 
towards Darfur. While it was debated whether Darfur was genocide, all the actors who 
lobbied called for increased action. Even thought some NGOs and grass root organizations 
lobbied for an American intervention, the NGOs were challenged by the fact that it was hard 
to influence a split Congress. In Congress, there were the two camps of those who favoured a 
defensive policy, and those who called for a more offensive oriented policy. There was also in 
2004 more NGOs and organizations that pressured the American political elite to take action. 
It was in other words more lobbying for American intervention in 2004 than in 1995.  
4.4.2 The role of Media 
It has previous been stated that media plays a political role in terms of “agenda-setting” and 
its ability to frame a situation. It has also been claimed that media tends to side with the 
victims (Robinson, 2002). The next section will study such statements in order to see how 
media influenced the American responses towards Bosnia and Darfur 
The role of media in Bosnia  
Journalists reported stories from Bosnia with a hope that they would move Western 
policymakers (Power, 2002:277). Through out the war, op-ed writers, human right activists, 
former diplomats, and journalists spoke out in opposition to Clinton’s policy. On a visit to 
London in July 1992, the Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadzic denied the atrocities, and 
challenged journalists to come see for themselves (Power, 2002:275). Karadzic was certain he 
could empty the camps before the journalists arrived, but he miscalculated as Western 
journalists arrived before him in Bosnia. Local Serb officials managed to stop reporters from 
entering the camps, but the reporters spotted a group of prisoners who arrived at the camp 
Trnopolje, and these pictures were sent home and broadcasted. Within the next two weeks, 
the major networks broadcasted forty-eight news stories of the atrocities in Bosnia (Power, 
2002:276). The pictures that were broadcasted influenced the American people since “there is 
an enormous difference between reading about atrocities and seeing those images (Power, 
2002:276).  The Western media was in other words present, and able to report home about the 
crimes being committed in Bosnia, but its presence has also been accused of being biased, 
acting as anti-Serbian propaganda. There was basically no Western media coverage that 
supported the Serbs.  
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 Edward Herman (2005) argues that media has played an important role in making the 
Srebrenica massacre a propaganda triumph. He states that media through out the Bosnian 
crisis repeatedly reported on Serbian attacks and atrocities. At the same time that Serbian 
aggression was reported, media failed to address the atrocities that had been carried out by the 
Croats and Bosnian Muslims. Herman (2005) claims, “Croatian authorities were delighted of 
a Srebrenica massacre since it deflected attention from their prior ethnic cleansing of Serbs 
and Bosnian Muslims in the Western part of Bosnia”. A misleading and selective framing of 
the Bosnian crisis was standard media practice” (Herman, 2005). Herman claims that Western 
media gave more attention to the Bosnian Serb prison camps than to Bosnian Muslim and 
Croatian prison camps, by providing a comparison of the media coverage of Srebrenica and 
Krajina. The case of Krajina was the ethnic cleaning of 250,000Serbs by the Croats only a 
month prior to the massacre of Srebrenica. While words as “cold-blooded killing”, 
“genocidal”, “aggression” and “ethnic cleansing” were used to characterize the crimes being 
committed by Serbs in Srebrenica, no such words were used by the media to explain the 
crimes committed by Croats in Krajina (Herman, 2005). Media chose what questions and 
issues to address with regards to the Bosnian crisis. The war in Bosnia-Herzegovina turned 
most media into propaganda tools in the hands of authorities, armies and factions20. 
Especially Bosnian Muslims were good at handling media, which resulted in the Western 
media siding of their case. Herman (2005) claims, “in case after case the media would report 
on Serb attacks and atrocities, having neglected to report the prior assaults on Serbs in those 
same towns and making the Serb behaviour seem like unprovoked acts of aggression and 
barbarity”. 
The role of media in Darfur  
Sidahmed, Soderlund and Briggs (2010:52) state that media coverage of Darfur remained 
fragmentary during the first years of the conflict. In The World and Darfur, Amanda Grzyb 
(2009:78-79) argues that in contrast to Rwanda, there was a slower pace of atrocities in 
Darfur and this had effects on media coverage in four ways. First of all, media coverage came 
too late, secondly, media had time to obtain fairly accurate information, third, coverage was 
decidedly inconsistent, and finally, due to the late media coverage, NGOs, activists and 
bloggers had time to develop websites with updated information on Darfur. Sidahmed, 
Soderlund and Briggs (2010:61) argue that, ”no network prime time television news stories 
                                                
20 Based on argumentation by BBC. For more: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/country_profiles/1066886.stm 
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dealing with Darfur were broadcast during 2003, the first year of the conflict”. They 
(2010:61) further state that only seventy-two stories were aired over four years. 
In 2009, the Amman Community Net, the Cairo Institute for Human Rights Studies, 
the International Media Support and Osservatorio di Paviacrisis published a report called, 
“Media coverage of the Darfur conflict in Sudanese and non-Sudanese media”21. The report 
presented some challenges that contributed to the late and limited media coverage. One 
challenge was the security situation, which limited the possibility to send journalists and news 
reports to Darfur. In addition to security issues, the costs of sending and keeping reports in the 
area might also explain the lack of media interests in Darfur (Sidahmed, Soderlund and 
Briggs, 2010:52). Another challenge was that the Sudanese government exercised control 
over the media coverage, which prohibited the work of journalists. Journalists were often 
prohibited from going to places, most often the refugee camps. The report (2009:45) also 
concluded that media coverage of the Darfur crisis was limited. It (2009:8) further claims the 
crisis “is first and foremost framed in a political dimension with the crisis framed as a 
political struggle between local Sudanese actors, and a struggle between the Sudanese 
government and the international community”. Media tended to focus on the international 
implications of the crisis as opposed to view the crisis with a local Sudanese context, 
“stressing that the crisis is caused by external factors such as the international community 
instead of local causes”. The report concluded that stories focusing on the refugees are very 
few, especially in the non-Sudanese media and the Sudanese state-controlled electronic 
media. The report (2009:8) states, “the refugees and other victims of the conflict are losing 
out in the media coverage in large part because when humanitarian issues are covered they 
tend to lean become politicized”. The victims of Darfur were in other words not able to 
effectively use the media. They did not have a clear “media strategy”, which resulted in a 
failure to actively manipulate media.  
Sidahmed, Soderlund and Briggs (2010:69-70) claim that the language used by 
Western media tended to be highly negative when describing the GOS and the Janjaweed, and 
more positive when describing the United States. The United States was credited for calling 
attention to the conflict by labelling it as genocide, and by pressuring the GOS. There were 
little mentions on the disconnection between defining Darfur as genocide and the failure to 
intervene. A positive media framing might have influenced the American willingness to 
                                                
21 Link to the report: http://www.i-m-s.dk/files/publications/1482%20Darfur.final.web.pdf 
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intervene in Darfur since media did not critically evaluate the American politics towards 
Darfur.  
Even though media coverage came late, some commentators claim that media 
attention increased as the crisis intensified in the spring of 2004, and that it was daily pictures 
from Darfur on television and in print (Sidahmed, Soderlund and Briggs, 2010:52). Grzyb 
(2009:83) further claims that even though media has played a role in putting Darfur on the 
agenda, “it is the NGOs and Darfur activist organizations that have truly kept up the pressure 
for international intervention”.  
A comparison of the role of media at the times of Bosnia and Darfur 
Media tends to support and side with the victims, or at least those who are presented as the 
victims in a conflict (Robinson, 2002). Media often choose to pick side in a conflict, and this 
is what happened in Bosnia where Western media sided with the Bosnian Muslims. A bias 
and selective media coverage might have framed and influenced the Western attitudes to 
become anti-Serbian, which further resulted in the American involvement in the war in 1995. 
According to a report from 2009 by the Amman Community Net, the Cairo Institute for 
Human Rights Studies, the International Media Support and Osservatorio di Paviacrisis, 
media was biased in the Darfur crisis in the sense of focusing on the international implications 
of the crisis as opposed to view the crisis with a local Sudanese context.  
Bosnian Muslims were good at managing media, and have them to serve their cause. 
The scenario was different in 2004 when the victims of Darfur were not able to use media to 
serve their cause. In addition, GOS also put restrictions on what Western media could report. 
The Bosnian Muslims therefore succeeded more in manipulating the media coverage in 1995 
than what the Darfur victims managed to do in 2004. Media also covered the Bosnian War 
more than the Darfur crisis. Media coverage of Darfur was late. Western media was more 
biased at the time of Bosnia, which became one of the factors that triggered the American 
intervention in 1995. At the same time, it is important to keep in mind that it was harder to 
report from Darfur than Bosnia since GOS put restrictions upon media. In the next section, I 
will further explore the argument that Bosnian Muslims succeeded in manipulating the 
Western World to take side in the Bosnian War. 
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 There was in other words a shift in the role of media from Bosnia to Darfur in the 
sense of a more biased and selective framing of the Bosnian War. In 1995, Bosnian Muslims 
succeeded in handling the media to frame their interests in a way that resulted in anti-Serbian 
attitudes. Media coverage of the Bosnian conflict mainly reflected what Robinson (2002) calls 
empathy framing. It sympathized with the Bosnian Muslims and pressured the Western 
governments to intervene. 
4.4.3 Local politics and local actor’s attention to influence 
It has been stated that local actors often tend to lobby their interests in a manipulating way in 
order to trigger a response. The next section will study whether local actors influenced the 
United States to intervene in Bosnia in 1995, and not to intervene in Darfur in 2004. 
Local politics and local actor’s attention to influence in Bosnia 
Herman (2005) argues, “The events of Srebrenica and the claims of a massacre were 
extremely helpful to the Clinton administration, the Bosnian Muslim leadership and Croatian 
authorities”. President Clinton was pressured to take more forceful action in order to stop the 
crisis. I have already addressed this issue by referring to the 104th Congressional debate. I will 
therefore address the argument that claims of a massacre in Srebrenica were helpful to the 
Bosnian Muslims and Croats.  
 First of all, Bosnian leaders had through out the whole war worked to have the NATO 
powers to intervene on their behalf. Herman (2005) claims that the Bosnian Muslim 
government engaged in a program to provoked the Serbs, lied about causalities in addition of 
trying to place all the blame on the Serbs. In the years prior to Srebrenica, thousands of Serb 
civilians was killed by Muslim forces, but this was not much addressed. Herman (2005) also 
addresses the confusion about causalities in the Srebrenica massacre. While this research 
project relies on 8,000 executed, Herman states that such number has been taken as a given 
since 1995. Herman (2005) argues that, “numerous of bodies found in local grave sites were 
victims of fighting, and many Bosnian Muslim men who fled Srebrenica reached Bosnian 
Muslim territory safely. Some bodies were also those of the many the Serbs who were killed 
in the forays by the Bosnian Muslims out of Srebrenica in the years before July 1995”. The 
Bosnian Muslim leadership also refused to disclose these names of those reaching safely. 
Herman (2005) argues that propaganda lies played a very important role in forwarding the 
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conflict, which created anti-Serb actions. Herman (2005:2) further addresses the statement 
that ”Bosnian Muslim officials have claimed that their leader, Alija Izetbegovic, told them 
that Clinton had advised him that U.S. intervention would only occur if the Serbs killed at 
least 5,000 at Srebrenica”. It is important not to exaggerate such statement since it is hard to 
find evidences for whether President Clinton actually stated so, but it should be kept in mind.  
 Also the Bosnian Prime minister Silajdzic lobbied the Bosnian Muslims case. He was 
aware of the lack of the American interest in the region, and argued, “They know what is 
happening to us, and it bothers them. But the American government talks only about its 
interest...and Bosnia is not a vital U.S interest” (Power, 2002:396). On January 31, 1995, 
Silajdzic attended a Congressional Hearing on the situation in Bosnia before the Commission 
on Security and Cooperation. In this hearing, Silajdzic (CH, 1995a:6) stressed that he was not 
asking for American troops in Bosnia. He demanded an increased American commitment to 
end the arms embargo in order to stop the crisis. The prime minister (CH, 1995a:6) summed 
up the Bosnian demands by announcing to the Committee that, “Rather than to “Americanize” 
the war as some say, ending the embargo would “Bosnianize” the war, and that is what we 
want. For the moment, because we cannot defend ourselves, the war is only “Serbianized”.  
 In the United States, it also developed an interesting debate concerning the ethnicity of 
the victims, and whether the West would have reacted differently and intervened faster if the 
victims were not Muslims. During a Congressional debate on lifting the arms embargo, 
Senator Biden (CR, 1995:S.9232) asked if the United States and the rest of the Western 
community would have cared differently if the victims in Bosnia had not been Muslims. 
Biden, who was among those who called for a political shift, asked “what if, a Moslem-
dominated Bosnia and Herzegovina had attacked a peaceful, Orthodox Christian Serbia...and 
then proudly announced that its policy of so-called ethnic cleansing had been successful, 
would Christian Europe then be sitting idly by?” In Congress a week earlier, Senator McCain 
(CR, 1995: S9879) had stated that, “If these were not Moslems, the world would be reacting”.  
 It was not only the Bosnian Muslims who lobbied their case at the time of the massacre 
of Srebrenica. Also the Croats advantaged from the anti-Serb attitudes that developed as 
evidences about Srebrenica reached the Western world. The Srebrenica massacre took away 
focus from crimes that the Croats had committed towards Serbs in the war. There were three 
main actors involved in the Bosnian War: Croats, Bosnian Muslims and Serbs. The war lasted 
for three years, and all parts committed crimes. But the war ended with the Srebrenica 
massacre, leaving the Serbs as the perpetrators, which resulted in anti-Serbian attitudes.  
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Local politics and local actor’s attention to influence in Darfur 
The international community met obstacles in their work to prevent and improve the 
humanitarian situation in Darfur since the GOS showed low willingness in cooperating. At the 
time of the Darfur crisis, the Sudanese government relied on the principle of state sovereignty 
and non-intervention. GOS stated that an international or American intervention would abuse 
such principle, in addition to reflect colonialist behaviour. President Al-Bashir often 
announced any team or state that dared to enter the Sudanese soil without permission would 
be violating the Sudanese sovereignty (Totten, 2009:208). In an interview given to Time in 
200922, Al-Bashir argued, “we think that the ICC is a tool to terrorize countries that the West 
thinks are disobedient…the court is directed against the countries of the third World and is a 
tool of neo-colonialism”. He further claimed his innocence in the Darfur crisis by stating that 
it was caused by environmental reasons of drought and scarcity of resources.  
Anders Kjølberg (2006:17) argues that there is an opposition between the Western 
World’s implementation of democracy and humanitarian interventions when human rights are 
at stake, and the resistance from the rest of the World against such policy. Kjølberg (2006:7) 
states that African states tend to consider the Western policy as colonialism and “new-
imperialism”. In 2004, Sudan was therefore not in favor of the new developments within 
international law on humanitarian intervention and R2P. Simmons (2009) argues that there 
are three ways governments tend to commit to human rights treaties; sincere ratifiers, false 
negatives and strategic ratifiers. The Sudanese commitment to R2P does not fit within any of 
Simmon’s classifications. Since R2P is considered to be far from Sudan’s ideal point, it is not 
favouring a commitment to its principles. Also African and Middle Eastern countries are 
supporting GOS in this view. While the countries of the North have acclaimed R2P, it has 
provoked controversy in the South. Bello (2011:1) states that, “Southern states have only 
relatively recently acquired independence from colonial occupation by waving the banner of 
national sovereignty”.  While the Western World tends to be more positive oriented towards 
international law and norms, states in Africa and the Middle East are more careful to comply 
with such ideas since they often tend to be more directly affected by them. International law 
and norms put obligations and responsibility upon states to react toward crimes against 
humanity, and such crimes are most likely to be found in African and Middle Eastern states.  
                                                
22 In order to read the whole interview, see: http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1916262-5,00.html 
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A comparison of local policy in Bosnia and Darfur, and local actor’s attention 
to influence 
At both the times of the conflicts in Bosnia and Darfur, there were local actors who succeeded 
in influencing the American attitudes, which further influenced the American response to the 
conflicts. While Bosnian Muslims lobbied their case and succeeded in creating anti-Serbian 
attitudes, the GOS strong reliance on the principle of state sovereignty and non-intervention 
influenced the American ability and willingness to intervene in Darfur. GOS relied on the 
principle of non-intervention, which made it hard for the Western community to intervene in 
order to stop the conflict. While local actors called for increased American involvement in 
Bosnia in 1995, local actors in Darfur worked against an American involvement.  
Both in 1995 and 2004, there were local actors who managed to influence the 
American policy on the conflicts, but external lobbying was greater in 1995 compared to 
2004. In 1995, regional actors were in favour of a Western intervention.  The scenario was 
different in 2004 as other actors in the region supported the GOS reliance on state 
sovereignty. While GOS had regional support, Republic Srpska was not supported from other 











The aim of my research project has been to study the American attitudes and response to 
genocide. In this last chapter, I will sum up my findings in order to conclude what factors that 
can best explain the attitudes and responses. While Darfur became the first time that an on-
going conflict was defined as genocide, Srebrenica was only defined as genocide ten years 
after, but in both conflicts men and boys were slaughtered down, women raped and villages 
burnt. Crimes against humanity were being committed against innocent civilians in both 
Bosnia and Darfur. What can explain the fact that the United States responded differently 
towards Bosnia and Darfur? Has the American reactions towards genocide changed?  
First of all, it is important to keep in mind the serious scope of both conflicts. Neither 
the crimes committed in Bosnia nor Darfur should be ranked as more serious than the other, 
but the United States responded differently towards the two serious conflicts. While the 
United States originally considered the Bosnian War as a European problem, it considered 
Darfur as an international problem. The 104th Congress debated whether to stick to its passive 
policy on Bosnia, or to adapt to a more offensive oriented policy by lifting the arms embargo. 
An offensive policy was first adapted when Europe had failed to stop the crisis, and 
Srebrenica fell in 1995. The 108th Congress was more consistent in its addressing of the 
Darfur crisis. The United States condemned the crimes being committed by the GOS against 
its innocent civilians. Further, the crimes were defined as genocide, and American action was 
taken in sense of economical resolutions. At the same time, it is important not to exaggerate 
the American response since there tended to be more words and promises than actual action. 
Instead of directly intervene in order to stop the crisis as was the case in Bosnia, the United 
States adapted a multilateral orientation by calling upon the UN to adapt similar policy. Such 
a multilateral orientation could be considered necessarily in order to maintain the American 
interests. In 2004, other actors, such as the great powers of China, Russia and European states 
were present, and had interests in Sudan. Besides the interests of other great powers, there 
were also other reasons, which influenced the American response. In 2004, the United States 
was involved in Afghanistan and Iraq, and could not afford to get involved in a third conflict. 
An additional factor was the complexity of the conflict in Sudan. Since 1955, the Northern 
and Southern Sudan had fought a violent civil war. A final peace agreement was signed in 
2005. The genocide in Darfur might have been forgotten in all the focus on the civil war and 
peace negotiations since it was only one element of the complex Sudanese conflict.  
58 
 
The American led NATO intervention in 1995 can also be explained in terms of 
maintenance of American interests. The Bosnian War had challenged the credibility of NATO 
to preserve security and peace. The intervention in 1995 can therefore be considered a tool to 
strengthen such credibility, which was certainly within the American interest. An intervention 
requires that attitudes and norms connects and reflect with the interests. For an intervention, it 
is simply not enough for only attitudes to be present. An intervention that has negative 
impacts on the interests will not take place. In 1995, it was not only within the American 
interests to launch a NATO intervention, since also local actors favoured a NATO 
intervention. The scenario was different in 2004 when local actors worked against an 
intervention. The African and Arabic World was favouring the principle of state sovereignty 
and non-intervention by claiming that an intervention reflected colonialism and imperialism.  
The fact that the United States adapted a multilateral orientation in 2004 can also be 
connected to an increased American reliance on international law. A finding of my study 
indicates that there was a shift in the presence and reliance of international law on genocide 
from 1995 to 2004. While the Genocide Convention was present at both the times of the 
conflicts in Bosnia and Darfur, R2P was only present at the time of Darfur. The 
Congressional debates of 2004 were also to a higher extending addressing the connection 
between crime and action. An implementation of the genocide definition leads to certain 
obligations and responsibilities, which the United States addressed more frequently in 2004 
than in 1995. The decision to declare Darfur as genocide could mean that the United States 
was aware of its obligations to react, which would mean that international law and norms had 
strengthened its position from 1995 to 2004. At the same time, it is important not to 
exaggerate such finding. By studying American foreign policy, it is important to be aware of 
the strong element of idealism, and the special relationship between idealism and realism. The 
increased reliance on international law in 2004 can simply be considered as an element of 
idealism, and not international law that the Bush administration was sceptical towards.  
Lobbying was one intervening variable that certainly influenced the American 
reactions towards Bosnia and Darfur. First of all, there were representatives within the 
American Congress who repeatedly took the floor in order to call for increased involvement, 
but most importantly, there were NGOs and other organizations that lobbied for increased 
American involvement. While domestic lobbying certainly played a role in influencing the 
American attitudes towards Bosnia in 1995, there was external lobbying that played a more 
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significant role. The scenario was opposite towards Darfur in 2004, when domestic lobbying 
played a more significant role than external lobbying. Even though local actors lobbied their 
cases in both 1995 and 2004, Bosnian Muslims lobbied more than the GOS. In 1995, Bosnian 
Muslims lobbied and manipulated their interests in order to trigger increased action and a 
Western intervention. As a result of such lobbying, the Western World chose to side with the 
Bosnian Muslims. Bosnian Muslims also succeeded to manipulate media in adapting an anti-
Serbian framing of the conflict. The Bosnian lobbying, and media’s framing resulted in a 
spread of anti-Serbian attitudes throughout the Western World, which lead to an intervention 
on Bosnian side.  
Besides domestic lobbying, there was the lobbying by local actors. Such external 
lobbying can certainly explain the American refusal to intervene in Darfur. While I have 
already pointed out that there was an American shift in the reliance on international norms 
and law from 1995 to 2004, the Sudanese Government did not reflect the same shift. R2P has 
become a Western supported norm, which has influenced the Western World’s attitudes to 
become more offensive oriented towards genocide. African and Middle Eastern states do not 
follow the same trend since state leaders in this region tend to consider humanitarian 
interventions to be politics of colonialism or “new-imperialism”. On background of this, Al 
Bashir and his regime refused a Western involvement in its state affairs. Sudan relied on the 
principle of state sovereignty and non-intervention, which again influenced the ability and 
willingness of the United States and the international community to intervene in Darfur. R2P 
tends to be closer to the ideal policy of the Western World than to the African and Middle 
Eastern states.  
 American attitudes and responses towards genocide can certainly not be explained in 
one single factor. A study of only structural and ideational explanations would conclude that 
an ideational explanation tends to explain American attitudes and response best since there 
was a shift in the presence and reliance on international law from 1995 to 2004. But such 
conclusion is exaggerating the importance of international law, since a shift in such variable 
simply can be explained as an element of the balance between real politics and idealism. Real 
politics certainly played a great role in shaping the American attitudes and response towards 
genocide, but this thesis has also proved that there were other intervening factors that 
influenced the American politics in 1995 and 2004. I have proved that local politics matters. 
In addition, I have showed that media plays a role in its framing of conflicts, which further 
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influenced the policy-making. The American attitudes and responses towards genocide are 
therefore not set, but rather shaped in a context where different explanational factors should 
be taken into account.  
As a closing remark, I want to empathize that even though the increased reliance of 
international law can be explained as an element of idealism, the increased development 
within the field on international law and norms on genocide prevention provides hope for a 
brighter future. The development of new norms on genocide provides hope for a future free of 
genocide. R2P is a new concept, and is still in the developing phase to find its place in the 
international system, but a strengthening of the norm in sense of states being more willingness 
to follow up the responsibilities put upon them when crimes against humanity is being 
committed provide hopes that genocide in the future might be prevented. Hopefully the 
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